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In 1990, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or the
"Commission") adopted Regulation S.1 Regulation S provided that off-
shore offers and sales of securities would be exempt from the 1933 Securi-
ties Act registration requirements as long as certain conditions were met.'
t SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has been quoted as saying that Regulation S was "one safe
harbor with too many pirates in it." Brett D. Fromson, SEC Tightens Overseas Sales Rules,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at F3 (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt).
*Mr. Jordan, a member of the District of Columbia and Florida bars, is a senior counsel
with the Southeast Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any pri-
vate publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's
colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. Additionally, certain matters discussed in this
article may be issues in litigation in which the commission appears as a party or otherwise,
and no statement made in this Article should be considered indicative of the views or posi-
tions that might be taken by the Commission in any such litigation. The author would like
to thank Edward H. Fleischman, consultant with the New York office of Linklater & Paines
and former Commissioner of the SEC, and Charles V. Senatore, vice president with Merrill
Lynch and former Regional Director at the Southeast Regional Office of the SEC, for their
valuable comments and review of this article.
'Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863, [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,524, at 80,661 (Apr. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Adopting
Release]. See also Regulation S - Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the
United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-
230.904 (1990) [hereinafter Original Regulation S].
2 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904 (1990). The terms "off-
shore" and "overseas" as used by this author for purposes of this article generally denote any
jurisdiction outside of the United States and should not be construed literally.
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Regulation S was intended to make the offshore markets more accessible to
domestic issuers and thereby reduce the cost of raising capital overseas.3
The regulation was a significant modification in the securities laws which
allowed domestic issuers the chance to compete and raise capital in the
global marketplace.
Not long after the regulation was adopted, unscrupulous market par-
ticipants quickly identified and took advantage of significant loopholes in
the regulation. In perhaps the most blatant violation of the intent and spirit
of the regulation, issuers created phony offshore shell entities as a means to
sell unregistered securities back into the United States. The Commission
soon undertook enforcement actions in an attempt to halt these abuses. But
despite the Commission's best efforts, these abuses continued. Finally, in
1998, the Commission amended Regulation S in an attempt to stop the abu-
sive practices it had spawned.4
This article will explain how the securities laws were prior to Regula-
tion S as they applied to the offshore offer and sale of securities. The
regulation as originally adopted and the brand new safe harbors it brought
to the laws governing offshore offers and sales will also be explored. Then
the subsequent regulatory abuses and concerns in the marketplace sur-
rounding the regulation and the Commission's response to these issues will
be discussed. The amendments to Regulation S which eventually served as
the Commission's way of halting these problems and the changes they
brought to the regulation will be laid out. Finally, this author will give
what he believes will be the probable impact of the amendments on prob-
lems underlying the regulation as well his recommendations on how to
eliminate these problems should they continue to occur after the amend-
ments. 5
II. REGULATION OF OFFSHORE SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS PRIOR TO
REGULATION S
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act" or the
"Act") requires the registration of any offer or sale of securities involving
the use of interstate commerce, absent an exemption. 6 "Interstate com-
merce" is defined under the Securities Act to include trade or commerce in
3 See Laurie P. Cohen, Rule Permitting Offshore Stock Sales Yields Deals that Spark SEC
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1994, at Cl.
' Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-7505, 63 Fed. Reg. 9632
(Feb. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Amending Release]; Regulation S - Rules Governing Offers
and Sales Made Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of
1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.905 (1998) [hereinafter Amended Regulation S].
5 It is important to note that this article will mainly focus on equity securities of domestic
issuers, as this is the area that has been most affected by the abuses and amendments to the
regulation. Equity securities of foreign issuers and debt securities will also be discussed but
will not be given the same kind of focus as equity securities of domestic issuers.
6 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
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securities between the United States and any foreign country.7 Considering
the definition of interstate commerce in conjunction with the requirements
under Section 5, the Securities Act originally purported to apply the regis-
tration requirements of Section 5 to securities offerings by domestic issuers
to foreign purchasers overseas. However, being that the Securities Act was
drafted during a time in which there were few international offerings, the
Securities Act as applied to these offerings was often the subject of broad
interpretation!
In 1964, the Commission attempted to define the extraterritorial reach
of the Securities Act's registration requirements through the promulgation
of Release 4708.' In Release 4708, the Commission took the position that
the registration requirements under Section 5 were primarily for. the pro-
tection of American investors.' ° In this regard, the Commission stated that
it would not take action based on a failure to register when securities were
distributed solely abroad to foreign nationals and such distributions were
effected in a manner that would result in the securities coming to rest
abroad."
A number of procedures were employed after the issuance of Release
4708 to ensure that securities sold in reliance on the release were sold to
foreign purchasers and came to rest abroad.' Such procedures were often
the subject of no-action letters by the Commission. 3 Despite a generous
amount of no-action letters, the Commission did not provide its specific
' Securities Act of 1933 § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(7) (1994).
'See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,664.
" Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-
4708 (July 9, 1964), 1964 WL 3661 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Release 4708]. This release was
actually a product of a presidential task force that was appointed in 1963 to develop pro-
grams for the increased marketing of domestic securities overseas. See id. A report was
submitted to the President by the task force on April 27, 1964, which contained, among
other things, a recommendation that the Commission publish a release setting forth its posi-
tion regarding the applicability of the registration requirements of the Securities Act to secu-
rities offered by domestic issuers to foreign purchasers. See id.
'0 See id.
" See id. The Commission came to this decision even though interstate commerce was
used in such distributions. See id. See also Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,664.
12 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,664. These procedures included a 90-day
lock-up period on securities before they could be issued in definitive form, agreements by
underwriters that they would not sell any unsold allotments within the United States or to
U.S. persons, and agreements by underwriters that they would deliver confirmations to other
dealers notifying them of the selling restrictions. See Edward F. Greene and Jennifer M.
Schneck, Recent Problems Arising under Regulation S, INSIGHTs, Aug. 1994, at 2.
"3 See Adopting Release, supra note I at 80,664 (citing InfraRed Associates, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 43 SEC Docket 368 (Sept. 13, 1985); Procter & Gamble Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 43 SEC Docket 364 (Feb. 21, 1985); Fairchild Camera and Instrument Inter-
national Finance N.V., SEC No-Action Letter, 43 SEC Docket 298 (Nov. 15, 1976); Ray-
mond International Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 43 SEC Docket 28 (May 28, 1976); Pan
American World Airways, Inc. 1975 WL 11264 (S.E.C.) (June 30, 1975); The Singer Com-
pany, SEC No-Action Letter, 43 SEC Docket 260 (Aug. 2, 1974)).
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view as to when securities issued pursuant to Release 4708 could be resold
back into the United States or to U.S. persons.' 4 The Commission only ad-
vised that such resales could take place as long as they were in compliance
with the registration requirements of the Securities Act or an exemption
therefrom.'5
The development of active international trading markets and the sig-
nificant increase in offshore offerings presented a growing number of
questions under the U.S. securities laws that could not be answered by Re-
lease 4708.6 This uncertainty caused many domestic corporations to
shield themselves from the possibility of sanctions by requesting their own
determinations by the Commission regarding the legality of certain off-
shore offerings prior to actually conducting them. 7 This was a costly ave-
nue to take, but almost a necessity, given the absence of clear guidance by
the Commission at the time.
III. ORIGINAL REGULATION S
In response to concerns over the laws relating to raising capital off-
shore, the Commission adopted Regulation S in 1990.8 The Commission
intended Regulation S to assist large financially-sound corporations in
selling securities to long-term foreign investors by exempting them from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act.'9 Regulation S clarified
the extraterritorial application of Section 5 by providing that securities of-
fered and sold outside the United States would not have to be registered
with the Commission. In essence, the regulation took a territorial ap-
proach to Section 5 by limiting the protective reach of Section 5 to inves-
tors that purchased securities within the U.S. markets.2 The Commission
14 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,664.
11 See id. (citing Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 13).
16 See Greene & Schneck, supra note 12, at 2; Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,664.
'7 See Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 13; Pan American Airways, Inc., supra note 13.
18 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904 (1990); Adopting Release,
supra note 1, at 80,662. Richard Breeden, SEC Chairman at the time of adoption, described
Regulation S as "a roadmap with clear guide posts that establish a safe harbor for transac-
tions outside the United States." SEC Adopts Reg. S and Rule 144A, Opening Door to Ex-
panded Era of Global Trading, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Apr. 23, 1990 (found on LEXIS,
NEWS library, ISRR file) (quoting then SEC Chairman Richard Breeden). Regulation S
was originally proposed in 1988, see Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No.
33-6779, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,242, at 89,123 (June
10, 1988) [hereinafter Proposing Release], and reproposed in 1989, see Offshore Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6838, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,426, at 80,209 (July 11, 1989) [hereinafter Re-proposing Release].
19 See Cohen, supra note 3, at Cl.
20 See id. See also Guy P. Lander, Regulation S - Securities Offerings Outside the
United States, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 339, 346 (1996).
21 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,665. The regulation defines a U.S. person
as "any natural person resident in the United States." Therefore, instead of protecting U.S.
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reasoned that "principles of comity and the reasonable expectations of par-
ticipants in the global markets" justified reliance on "laws applicable in ju-
risdictions outside the United States to define requirements for transactions
effected offshore."'
Regulation S generally consists of a series of rules that, if complied
with, will in effect exempt offshore offers and sales of securities from the
Section 5 registration requirements.' The regulation specifically consists
of a general statement governing the applicability of the registration re-
quirements to offshore offerings (the "General Statement") and two safe
harbors which provide when such offerings and secondary resales of un-
registered securities offshore will fall under the provisions of the General
Statement.24
It is important to note that Regulation S was amended in 1998 to ad-
dress various abuses of the regulation.' The amendments substantially
changed the classification of securities covered under the safe harbors and
modified some of the requirements needed to comply within the regulation.
To determine if these amendments addressed some of the negative aspects
of the original regulation, it is important to look at the original regulation
and the subsequent abuses in it. Most of the provisions in the original
regulation survived the amendments; therefore, many of the requirements
and safe harbor provisions underlying the original regulation will also ap-
ply to the current amended regulation. The changes that did occur through
the amendments will be covered in greater detail later in this article.26
A. The General Statement Providing that Offers and Sales of Securities
Outside the United States are not Subject to the Section 5 Registration
Requirements.
Rule 901 of Regulation S is a general statement regarding the applica-
bility of the Section 5 registration requirements to offerings conducted off-
citizens wherever they live, as was the case with the extraterritorial approach of Release
4708, Regulation S was intended to protect investors purchasing in the U.S. markets, re-
gardless of whether they are U.S. or foreign nationals. See id. at 80,676; Original Regula-
tion S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(o)(i) (1990). See also infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
The exception to this rule is that offers and sales of securities "specifically targeted at identi-
fiable groups of U.S. citizens abroad, such as members of the U.S. armed forces serving
overseas," will not fall under the Regulation S safe harbors. Original Regulation S, 17
C.F.R. § 230.902(i)(2) (1990). Specifically, such transactions will not meet within the defi-
nition of an offshore transaction required under the safe harbors. See id. See also infra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
' Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,665. In this regard, the Commission basically
took the position that investors choose the laws in the markets in which they choose to in-
vest. See id.
'3 See generally Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§230.901-230.904 (1990).
24 See id.
21 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9632.26 See discussion infra Part VI.
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shore.27 The General Statement provides that the registration requirements
under Section 5 do not apply to the offer or sale of securities outside of the
United States.2" The determination as to whether an offer or sale occurred
outside of the United States will generally be based upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case." However, the regulation itself provides two safe
harbor categories that lay out applicable conditions for when an offer or
sale will be considered to have occurred outside of the United States for
purposes of the General Statement.3"
Before going into the specific requirements underlying the safe har-
bors, it is important to touch on one of the preliminary notes to Regulation
S. Preliminary Note 2 of Regulation S provides that the regulation is not
available with respect to "any transaction or series of transactions that, al-
though in technical compliance with the rules, is part of a plan or scheme to
evade" the registration provisions of the Act.3 This provision in the regu-
27 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,665; Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.901 (1990).
" See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,665. The language in the General Statement
specifically states that "for the purposes only of Section 5 of the Act, the terms 'offer,' 'offer
to sell,' 'sell,' 'sale,' and 'offer to buy' shall be deemed to include offers and sales that oc-
cur within the United States" and does not "include offers and sales that occur outside of the
United States." Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1990). "United States" is de-
fined as the United States of America, its territories and possessions, any State of the United
States, and the District of Columbia. See id. § 230.902(p).
21 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,665. In the original proposed and repro-
posed Regulation S, the General Statement had listed specific factors to be considered in
determining whether an offer or sale occurred outside the United States. See id. These fac-
tors included (1) the locus of the constituent elements of the offer or sale; (2) the absence of
any directed selling efforts in the United States; (3) the likelihood of the securities coming to
rest outside of the United States; and (4) the justified expectation of the parties concerning
the applicability of the registration requirements. See Proposing Release, supra note 18, at
89,131-33; Re-proposing Release, supra note 18, at 80,210. The Re-proposing Release left
the original list of factors for consideration but acknowledged that various commentators
had criticized different aspects of this list and requested further comment as to whether the
entire list should be deleted from the General Statement. See Re-proposing Release, supra
note 18, at 80210. See also Gerard R. Boyce and Dan C. Aardal, Offshore Securities Distri-
butions, Regulation S, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1995, at 5. In response to commentators ex-
pressing concern about this list, the Commission deleted the list from the General Statement
as it was finally adopted. See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,666.
10 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,666. It is important to note that the Com-
mission in the Adopting Release seemed to indicate that the General Statement could be
used alone as a basis in determining whether the registration provisions of the Securities Act
would apply "regardless of whether the conditions of the safe harbor[s] are met." Id. at
80,665. However, the securities practitioner would be wise not to rely solely on the General
Statement alone when structuring an offshore securities transaction. Rather, the elements for
the safe harbors should be carefully followed to ensure that an offer or sale is outside of the
United States, as defined by the General Statement. See generally id. at 80,666; Original
Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903-230.904 (1990).
31 Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. Preliminary Note 2 (1990). In such cases, registra-
tion under the Act is required. See id. See also Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,665.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:58 (1998)
lation is significant in that it is broad enough to allow an enforcement ave-
nue by the SEC for perceived abuses and unintended uses of Regulation S
regardless of whether the conditions of the safe harbors are met.
B. Issuer and Resale Safe Harbors Providing Conditions for when an
Offer and Sale are Outside the United States for Purposes of the General
Statement
Regulation S sets forth two non-exclusive safe harbors for the extrater-
ritorial offer, sale and resale of securities.32 Rule 903 of the regulation pro-
vides a safe harbor for issuers conducting offerings outside of the United
States (the "issuer safe harbor").33 Any offer or sale by the issuer, dis-
tributor, and any of their respective affiliates or agents that meet the re-
quirements of the issuer safe harbor is considered outside of the United
States for purposes of the General Statement.34 Rule 904 of the regulation
provides a safe harbor for the offshore resale of unregistered securities (the
"resale safe harbor").3 Any offer or sale of securities by any person other
than the issuer, distributor, and any of their respective affiliates or agents
that meet the requirements of the resale safe harbor is considered outside of
the United States for purposes of the General Statement.36 The issuer and
resale safe harbors both provide means for qualifying securities transac-
tions as occurring "outside of the United States" for purposes of the Gen-
eral Statement.
1. Two General Conditions Required Under the Issuer and Resale Safe
Harbors: The "Offshore Transaction" and "No Directed Selling Efforts in
the United States" Requirements
There are two general conditions that apply to all offers, sales and re-
sales made in reliance on the issuer or resale safe harbors.37 The first con-
dition is that an offer or sale must be made in an "offshore transaction."38
The second condition requires that there be no "directed selling efforts" in
the United States in connection with the offer or sale.39
An offer or sale of securities is made in an offshore transaction if the
offer is not made to a person in the United States and either (1) at the time
32 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903-230.904 (1990); Adopting Release,
supra note 1, at 80,666.
" See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (1990); Adopting Release, supra note
1, at 80,666.
34See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,666.
3 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904 (1990); Adopting Release, supra note
1, at 80,666.
36See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,666.
37See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(a)-(b), 230.904(a)-(b).38 Id. §§ 230.903(a), 230.904(a).
39 Id. §§ 230.903(b), 230.904(b).
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the buy order is originated the buyer is outside the United States or the
seller, and any person acting on its behalf, reasonably believes that the
buyer is outside the United States; or (2)(a) for purposes of the issuer safe
harbor, the transaction is executed in, on or through a physical trading floor
of a foreign securities exchange; or (b) for purposes of the resale safe har-
bor, the transaction is executed in, on or through the facilities of a desig-
nated offshore securities market.4" The regulation lists the exchanges that
constitute designated offshore securities market(s) for purposes of the re-
quirements of an offshore transaction.4"
40 See id. § 230.902(i).
41 Rule 902(a) defines a "designated offshore securities market" to mean:
(1) the Eurobond market, as regulated by the Association of International Bond Deal-
ers; the Amsterdam Stock Exchange; the Australian Stock Exchange Limited; the Bourse
de Bruxelles; the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Lim-
ited; The International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ire-
land, Ltd.; the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; the Bourse de Luxembourg; the Borsa
Valori di Milan; the Montreal Stock Exchange; the Bourse de Paris; the Stockholm Stock
Exchange; the Tokyo Stock Exchange; the Toronto Stock Exchange; the Vancouver
Stock Exchange; and the Zurich Stock Exchange.
(2).any foreign securities exchange or non-exchange market designated by the Com-
mission. Attributes to be considered in determining whether to designate such a foreign
securities market, among others, include:
(i) organization under foreign law;
(ii) association with a generally recognized community of brokers, dealers, banks, or
other professional intermediaries with an established operating history;
(iii) oversight by a governmental or self-regulatory body;
(iv) oversight standards set by an existing body of law;
(v) reporting of securities transactions on a regular basis to a governmental or self-
regulatory body;
(vi) a system for exchange of price quotations through common communications me-
dia; and
(vii) an organized clearance and settlement system.
Id. § 230.902(a). In addition to the 17 foreign exchanges originally specified in Rule
902(a)(1), Rule 902(a)(2) authorizes the SEC to designate additional foreign securities ex-
changes as "designated offshore securities market[s]." Id. § 230.902(a)(2). Since the adop-
tion of Original Regulation S, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, pursuant to
specific authority delegated to it under Section 200.30-10) of the SEC's Rules of Practice,
has designated, through interpretative letters, an additional ten exchanges as "designated
offshore securities market[s]." These exchanges include the Helsinki Stock Exchange, see
Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,498, at
77,529 (July 7, 1990); the Mexican Stock Exchange, see Mexican Stock Exchange, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 490027 (SEC) (Feb. 2, 1991); the Oslo Stock Exchange, see
Oslo Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 276820 (SEC) (Dec. 13, 1991); the
Alberta Stock Exchange, see Alberta Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL
142832 (SEC) (Mar. 9, 1993); the Istanbul Stock Exchange, see Istanbul Stock Exchange,
SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,810, at 78,258 (Oct. 26, 1993); the
Irish Stock Exchange, see Irish Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 162453
(SEC) (Apr. 5, 1996); the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, see Copenhagen Stock Exchange,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 382557 (SEC) (July 9, 1996); the Bermuda Stock Ex-
change, see Bermuda Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 591165 (SEC)
(Oct. 11, 1996); the Stock Exchange of Singapore Ltd., see Stock Exchange of Singapore
Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 149357 (SEC) (Apr. 1, 1997); and the Warsaw Stock
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A person making an offer or sale otherwise in accordance with the
conditions of the issuer safe harbor will be unable to rely on that safe har-
bor if any directed selling efforts are being made in the United States by an
issuer, distributor, or any of their respective affiliates or agents.42 With re-
spect to the resale safe harbor, any directed selling efforts by the seller and
any of its affiliates or agents will preclude reliance on the resale safe har-
bor by that seller.43 Directed selling efforts are those activities that could
reasonably be expected to have the effect of conditioning the market in the
United States for any of the securities being offered or sold in reliance on
Regulation S.'
If a transaction meets the two general conditions of an (1) offshore
transaction and (2) no directed selling efforts in the United States then it
might qualify under the issuer or resale safe harbor.45 The issuer and resale
safe harbors delineate supplemental conditions, if any, beyond the two gen-
eral conditions that are needed to meet the requirements under the preferred
safe harbor category.
Exchange, see Warsaw Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 277246 (SEC)
(May 22, 1997). See generally Update of Regulation S "Designated Offshore Securities
Market," FIN. REG. REP. (found on LEXIS, NEWS (June 1996).42 Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (1990). See also Adopting Release, su-
pra note 1, at 80,668. Under the issuer safe harbor, directed selling efforts in the United
States may not be made during the period the issuer, distributor, their respective affiliates or
any persons acting on their behalf are offering and selling the securities and/or during the
restricted period for offerings falling under the second and third issuer safe harbor catego-
ries. See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,668.
41 Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(b) (1990). See also Adopting Release, su-
pra note 1, at 80,668. Directed selling efforts by any other person will not affect the seller's
ability to rely on the resale safe harbor. See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,668.
44 Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b)(1) (1990). Activities such as mailing
printed materials to U.S. investors, conducting promotional seminars in the United States or
placing advertisements with radio or television stations broadcasting into the United States
or in publications with a general circulation in the United States, which discuss the offering
or are otherwise intended to condition, or could reasonably be expected to condition, the
market for the securities, constitute directed selling efforts in the United States. See Adopt-
ing Release, supra note 1, at 80,668. A publication with a general circulation in the United
States is one that is printed primarily for distribution in the United States or that has had,
during the preceding twelve months, an average circulation in the United States of 15,000 or
more copies an issue. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(k)(1) (1990). When
an issuer is not a reporting issuer, the Commission has deemed the distribution or publica-
tion of information about the issuer or its securities to be more significant due to the possi-
ble lack of publicly available information about the issuer. See Adopting Release, supra
note 1, at 80,669-70. Therefore the Commission has cautioned that distributors and their
affiliates should exercise even greater caution in the publication or distribution of informa-
tion concerning nonreporting issuers and their securities. See id. See also ROBERT J. HAFT,
ANALYSiS OF KEY SEC No-AcTioN LETTERS 2-5 (1996-97 ed.).45See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(a)-(b), 230.904(a)-(b) (1990).
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2. Issuer Safe Harbor
The issuer safe harbor generally applies to offers and sales by issuers,
distributors, their affiliates, and any persons acting on their behalf.46 The
issuer safe harbor is divided into three categories with varying procedural
safeguards imposed on each.4' The criteria used to divide securities into
these three categories reflect the degree of information available to U.S. in-
vestors and the likelihood of the*securities flowing back into the United
States. Category One generally applies to the securities of non-U.S. issu-
ers including the securities of foreign issuers with no substantial market
interest in the United States for their securities.49 Category Two applies to
the securities of foreign reporting issuers with a substantial market interest
in the United States for their securities, and certain securities issued by
nonreporting foreign issuers. " Category Two originally applied to the se-
curities of domestic reporting issuers but the amendments later placed these
securities into the third issuer safe harbor category." Category Three ap-
plies to the securities of all other issuers not covered under the first two is-
suer safe harbor categories, including the securities of domestic
nonreporting issuers and foreign nonreporting issuers with a substantial
market interest in the United States for their securities. 2
(a) Category One
The first issuer safe harbor category applies to securities offered and
sold by foreign issuers"3 with no "substantial U.S. market interest" for their
45See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (1990).
4' See id. § 230.903(c)(I)-(3).
4 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,671. For domestic issuers, the issuer safe
harbor originally prescribed fewer restrictions for securities offered by reporting issuers un-
der Category Two than for nonreporting issuers under Category Three. See Original Regu-
lation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2)-(3) (1990). These differences were reflective of the
Commission's view that investors in securities issued by reporting issuers had the protection
of the Exchange Act periodic reporting requirements whereas investors in nonreporting is-
suers did not. See Adopting Release, supra note I, at 80,675. The amendments changed
this distinction in the regulation between domestic reporting and nonreporting issuers when
domestic reporting issuers were moved into the third issuer safe harbor category. See infra
note 236 and accompanying text.
11 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(1) (1990). The exception to this is
that Category One securities offered and sold pursuant to employee benefit plans established
and administered in accordance with the laws of a foreign country can be securities of do-
mestic issuers. See id. § 230.903(c)(1)(iv). See also infra note 57 and accompanying text.
s0 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2) (1990).
s' See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
52 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3) (1990).
5 A "foreign issuer" is generally any issuer that is (1) a "foreign government;" (2) a "na-
tional of any foreign country;" or (3) a "corporation or other organization incorporated or
organized under the laws of any foreign country." Id. § 230.902(f).
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securities,' securities offered and sold in "overseas directed offerings,""5
securities backed by the full faith and credit of a foreign government, 6 and
securities offered and sold pursuant to certain employee benefit plans es-
tablished and administered in accordance with the laws of a foreign coun-
try. 7 Offers and sales under this category require no additional conditions
other than the two general conditions of an offshore transaction and no di-
rected selling efforts in the United States." This category is the least re-
strictive of the issuer safe harbor categories because securities covered
4 Id. § 230.903(c)(1)(i)(A)-(D). A "substantial U.S. market interest" in a class of a for-
eign issuer's equity securities is defined to exist where "at the commencement of the offer-
ing" (1) the "securities exchanges and inter-dealer quotation systems in the United States in
the aggregate constitute the single largest market for such securities in the shorter of the is-
suer's prior fiscal year or the period since the issuer's incorporation;" or (2) "20 percent or
more of the trading in the class of securities took place in, on or through the facilities of se-
curities exchanges and inter-dealer quotation systems in the United States and less than 55
percent of such trading took place in, on or through the facilities of securities markets of a
single foreign country in the shorter of the issuer's prior fiscal year or the period since the
issuer's incorporation." Id. § 230.902(n)(1)(i)-(ii). See also Adopting Release, supra note
1, at 80,673.
ss See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(1)(ii) (1990). An "overseas di-
rected offering" is: (1) "an offering of securities of a foreign issuer that is directed into a
single country other than the United States to the residents thereof and that is made in accor-
dance with the local laws and customary practices and documentation of such country;" or
(2) "an offering of non-convertible debt securities," asset-backed securities or non-
participating preferred stock of domestic issuers directed to residents of a single foreign
country "in accordance with the local laws, and customary practices and documentation of
such country, provided that the principal and interest of the securities (or par value, as appli-
cable) are denominated in a currency other than U.S. dollars and such securities are neither
convertible into U.S. dollar-denominated securities nor linked to U.S. dollars (other than
through related currency or interest rate swap transactions that are commercial in nature) in a
manner that in effect converts the securities to U.S. dollar-denominated securities." Id. §
230.902(j). See also Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,674.
11 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(1)(iii) (1990). A "foreign govern-
ment" is "the government of any foreign country or of any political subdivision of a foreign
country, provided that such person would qualify to register securities under the Act on
Schedule B." Id. § 230.902(e).
57 See id. § 230.902(c)(1). Offerings of securities to employees of a domestic or foreign
issuer pursuant to an "employee benefit plan" established and administered in accordance
with the laws of a foreign country may be made under the first issuer safe harbor category
provided that: (1) "the securities are issued in compensatory circumstances for bona fide
services rendered to the issuer or its affiliates in connection with their businesses and such
services are not rendered in connection with the offer and sale of securities in a capital-
raising transaction;" (2) "any interests in the plan are not transferable other than by will or
the laws of descent or distribution;" (3) "the issuer takes reasonable steps to preclude the of-
fer and sale of interests in the plan or securities under the plan to U.S. residents other than
employees on temporary assignment in the United States;" and (4) "documentation used in
connection with any offer pursuant to the plan contains a statement that the securities have
not been registered under the Act and may not be offered or sold in the United States unless
registered or an exemption from registration is available." Id. § 230.903(c)(1)(iv).
" See id. § 230.903(c)(1).
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under it are considered to pose the least risk to domestic investors in terms
of their potential of flowing back into the United States."
(b) Category Two
The second issuer safe harbor category originally applied to the secu-
rities of domestic reporting issuers, securities of foreign reporting issuers
with a substantial market interest in the United States for their securities,
debt securities of nonreporting foreign issuers, and non-participating pre-
ferred stock and asset-backed securities of nonreporting foreign issuers.60
Significantly, this category originally applied to the equity securities of
domestic reporting issuers and foreign reporting issuers with a substantial
market interest in the United States for their securities.6 1 Domestic report-
ing issuers were later moved into the third issuer safe harbor category with
the amendments to the regulation.62
Securities under Category Two are subject to the two general condi-
tions of an offshore transaction and no directed selling efforts in the United
States, as well as an additional set of selling restrictions.63 These selling
" See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,672. In this regard, it is important to realize
that the sale of unregistered Regulation S securities into the U.S. by dealers during the 40
days following the first date when such securities were offered to the public would not be
exempt under Section 4(3) of the Securities Act. Id. at 80672 n.84; Securities Act of 1933 §
4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(3) (1994).6oSee Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2) (1990).
dl See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2) (1990). These issuers are gener-
ally required to file reports with the SEC under the Exchange Act. A "reporting issuer" is
specifically defined in the regulation as an issuer, other than an investment company, regis-
tered or required to register under the 1940 Act that: (1) "has a class of securities registered
pursuant to Section 12(b) or 12(g) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) or § 781(g)
(1997); or is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1997);" and (2) "has filed all the material required to be filed pursuant to
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a) and 78o(d) (1997), for a
period of at least twelve months immediately preceding the offer or sale of securities made
in reliance upon... Regulation S (or for such shorter period that the issuer was required to
file such material)." Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(l) (1990). For a definition
of "substantial U.S. market interest," see supra note 54 and accompanying text. Foreign is-
suers (reporting and nonreporting) with no substantial U.S. market interest for their securi-
ties are covered under Category 1. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(1)(i)
(1990).
6 See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
63 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2)(ii)-(iv) (1990). These selling re-
strictions were "designed to protect against an indirect unregistered public offering in the
U.S. during the period the market is most likely to be affected by selling efforts offshore."
Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,675. The Commission had the view that if a reporting
issuer's securities were to flow back into the United States following the end of a restricted
period, the information relating to such securities publicly available under the Exchange Act
would generally be sufficient enough to ensure investor protection. See id.
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restrictions can generally be divided into transactional restrictions and of-
fering restrictions.'
The transactional restrictions under Category Two require that securi-
ties sold prior to the expiration of a 40 day restricted period not be offered
or sold to or for the benefit of a U.S. person.65 Distributors selling securi-
ties to certain securities professionals during the restricted period must
send a confirmation or other notice to the purchaser stating that the pur-
chaser is subject to the same restrictions on offers and sales that apply to
the selling distributor.6"
The definition of a "U.S. person" plays an important role in the trans-
actional restrictions as well as in the entire regulation. Under Regulation S
the definition of a U.S. person focuses on residency rather than citizen-
ship.67 Regulation S specifically defines a U.S. person as "any natural per-
son resident in the United States."6" Therefore any domestic or foreign
national resident in the United States is automatically considered a U.S.
person under Regulation S.69 In the case of corporations, the place of in-
corporation or organization generally controls.7" The Commission has
noted, however, that a corporation incorporated or organized in a foreign
jurisdiction by a U.S. person for purposes of investing in securities not
registered with the Commission will still fall under the definition of a U.S.
person for purposes of Regulation S.71
There are two offering restrictions, in addition to the transactional re-
strictions, that must be adhered to under Category Two.72 These offering
restrictions also apply to securities covered under Category Three and must
" See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,676.
61 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2)(iii) (1990). Persons relying on
this category must ensure "by whatever means they choose" that any non-distributor they
sell securities to is a non-U.S. person and is not purchasing for the "account or benefit of a
U.S. person." Adopting Release, supra note I, at 80,676. A restricted period generally is a
"period that commences on the later of the date upon which the securities were first offered
to persons other than distributors in reliance upon Regulation S or the date of closing of the
offering, and expires a specified period of time thereafter." Original Regulation S, 17
C.F.R. § 230.902(m) (1990).
6See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2)(iv) (1990).
61See id. § 230.902(o).
68 Id. § 230.902(o)(1)(i).
69 See generally Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,676. The Adopting Release states
as an example that a French citizen resident in the United States is deemed a U.S. person for
purposes of Regulation S. See id.
70 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(o)(1)(ii) (1990). An agency or branch
of a foreign entity located in the United States is deemed a U.S. person. See id. §
230.902(o)(1)(v).
" See id. § 230.902(o)(viii)(A)-(B).
72 See id. § 230.903(c)(2)(ii). The offering restrictions in the original regulation were
outlined under Rule 902(h). See id. § 230.902(h).
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be adopted with regard to the entire offering.7' The first offering restriction
requires that every distributor agree in writing that offers and sales made
prior to the expiration of the restricted period will be conducted in compli-
ance with the safe harbor provisions governing Regulation S, or pursuant to
registration or an exemption.' The second offering restriction requires that
offering materials and documents used in connection with the offer and
sale of Regulation S securities during the restricted period include state-
ments "to the effect that the securities have not been registered" and "may
not be offered or sold in the United States or to U.S. persons" unless they
are registered or there is an exemption.75
(c) Category Three
Securities not covered under the first two issuer safe harbor categories
fall into the residual third issuer safe harbor category.76 Securities in this
category include equity securities of domestic nonreporting issuers and of
foreign nonreporting issuers with a substantial market interest in the United
States for their securities." The procedures under Category Three are more
stringent than the other two categories because they are intended to protect
against unregistered U.S. distributions where there is a significant likeli-
"' See id. § 230.903(c)(3)(i); Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,679. Offering re-
strictions are essentially "procedures set up to ensure compliance with the transactional re-
strictions." Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,679.
74See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h)(1) (1990).
s See id. § 230.902(h)(2). Such offering materials and documents include, among other
things, prospectuses, offering circulars, and advertisements. See id. § 230.902(h)(2)(i)-(iii).
76 See id. § 230.903(c)(3); Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,679.
' See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3) (1990). Domestic reporting is-
suers are later included in this category with the amendments. See infra note 247 and ac-
companying text. It is important to note that Category Three is divided between debt and
equity securities. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(ii)-(iii) (1990). In
the case of debt securities, the two general conditions of an offshore transaction and no di-
rected selling efforts in the U.S. have to be followed along with the offering restrictions that
are generally required for Category Two securities. See id. § 230.903(c)(3)(i). See also su-
pra notes 72-75 concerning offering restrictions. Debt securities that fall under Category
Three are only subject to a 40 day restricted period and have to be represented by temporary
global securities not exchangeable for definitive securities until the expiration of this re-
stricted period. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(ii)(A)-(B). Upon ex-
piration of the restricted period, "persons exchanging their temporary global securit[ies] for.
.. definitive securit[ies] are required to certify beneficial ownership by: a non-U.S. person or
a U.S. person who purchased securities in a transaction that did not require registration un-
der the Securities Act." Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,680 (citing requirements of
17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(ii)(B)). Distributors selling Category Three debt securities are
also required to provide notice to purchasers that such purchasers are subject to the same re-
strictions as those that applied to the distributor. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.903(c)(3)(iv) (1990). For purposes of this article the terms "Category Three" or "Cate-
gory Three securities" will generally focus on equity securities covered under Category
Three.
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hood of the securities flowing back into the United States and there is little
information about the issuer in the marketplace.78
Securities under Category Three must meet the two general conditions
of an offshore transaction and no directed selling efforts in the United
States.79 They are also required to meet the two offering restrictions re-
quired under Category Two, with the exception that Category Three secu-
rities are subject to a one year, rather than a 40 day, restricted period."
Category Three securities are subject to a set of transactional require-
ments that are more rigorous than those required under Category Two.8 In
addition to the restrictions noted above, 2 purchasers of these securities,
other than distributors, are required to certify that they are not U.S. persons
and are not acquiring the securities for the account or benefit of a U.S. per-
son." These purchasers are also required to agree to resell these securities
only in compliance with the rules governing Regulation S, or pursuant to
registration or any other exemption.84
Other Category Three transactional restrictions require that a legend
be placed on the securities of Category Three domestic issuers stating that
transfers in these securities are prohibited except in accordance with the
provisions governing Regulation S.85 The issuer, by contract, provision in
its bylaws, or other comparable document, must also refuse to register any
transfer of Category Three securities not made in accordance with Regula-
tion S.86 Distributors selling equity or debt securities prior to the expiration
of the restricted period additionally are required to notify purchasers that
they are subject to the same restrictions as the distributor.8
11 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,679.
11 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3) (1990).
80 See id. §§ 230.902(h), 230.903(c)(3)(i), 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(A). See also supra notes
72-75 concerning the offering restrictions. These offering restrictions are later modified
with the amendments as they apply to domestic issuers covered under Category Three. See
infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
"t See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(ii)-(iv) (1990). These transac-
tional restrictions are similar to those that evolved under the no-action letters interpreting
Release 4708, and distinguish between debt and equity securities. See Adopting Release,
supra note 1, at 80,679. Some of these transactional restrictions are also later modified with
the amendments as they apply to domestic issuers covered under Category Three. See infra
notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
82 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(A) (1990).
8 See id. § 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(B)(1).
84 See id. § 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(B)(2). This transactional restriction is later modified with
the amendments. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
" See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(B)(3) (1990). This transac-
tional restriction is later modified with the amendments. See infra notes 260-61 and accom-
panying text.
86 Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(B)(4) (1990).
87 See id. § 230.903(c)(3)(iv). Two types of nonreporting domestic securities that are a
category of their own include non-convertible, non-participating preferred stock and asset-
backed securities. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(4) (1990). These
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3. Resale Safe Harbor
Sales of unregistered securities require an exemption from registra-
tion, regardless of whether the sale is made by the issuer or a subsequent
purchaser.8 While there are exemptions that could be utilized for the re-
sale of unregistered securities, the resale safe harbor of Rule 904 of Regu-
lation S provides one of the easiest methods. " The resale safe harbor
essentially provides a safe harbor for the offshore resale of unregistered se-
curities by persons other than the issuer, distributor or any of their respec-
tive affiliates or agents."° Persons eligible for the resale safe harbor only
have to meet the two general conditions: the transaction must take place
offshore, and no directed selling efforts may occur in the United States.9'
If these general conditions are met, then the resale is considered to have
occurred outside of the United States for purposes of the General Statement
and the registration requirements.92
Regulation S was intended to provide domestic corporations with eas-
ier access to the offshore securities markets and greater leverage in the
growing international financial marketplace.9 These provisions would in-
types of securities are subject to the same restrictions as debt securities covered under the
third category, including a restricted period of 40 days rather than one year. See id. See
also Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,679.
"8 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1994).
89 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904 (1990). The most significant exemp-
tions that could apply would be those covered under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act and
Rule 144. Section 4(l) provides that the registration requirements of the Securities Act do
not apply to transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer. Securi-
ties Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994). Rule 144 provides a non-exclusive safe-
harbor under Section 4(1). Rule 144, Persons Deemed Not to Be Engaged in a Distribution
and Therefore Not Underwriters, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1997) [hereinafter Rule 144]. Rule
144 restricts resales of unregistered domestic securities bought in private placements, re-
quires the filing of financial reports, and mandates at least a one year holding period before
the securities can be resold. See id. § 230.144(c)-(e).
I See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904 (1990). An officer or director of an is-
suer or distributor is eligible to rely upon the resale safe harbor if the sole reason such offi-
cer or director may be deemed an affiliate is by virtue of position, provided that no special
selling compensation is paid in connection with the offer and sale by such officer or direc-
tor. See id. § 230.904(c)(2); Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,680.
91 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(a)-(b) (1990).
92 See id. § 230.904. Securities professionals are subject to two additional conditions for
the resale safe harbor. See id. § 230.904(c)(1). One of the conditions requires that, if the
securities being resold do not fall under Category One, and the resale is made prior to the
expiration of any applicable restricted period, then the securities professional or any person
acting on his or her behalf may not knowingly offer or sell such securities to a U.S. person.
See id. § 230.904(c)(1)(i). Another condition requires that, if the selling securities profes-
sional or a person acting on his or her behalf knows the purchaser of the securities is a secu-
rities professional, then the seller is required to send a confirmation or other notice of the
applicable restrictions to the purchaser. See id. § 230.904(c)(1)(ii). See also Adopting Re-
lease, supra note 1, at 80,680-81.
" Cohen, supra note 3, at Cl.
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crease U.S. competitiveness offshore and lower the cost of raising capital
abroad.94 Regulation S was also designed to provide certainty for issuers
that did not exist under Release 4708 and its subsequent no-action letters.9
Unfortunately, with the benefits of the regulation also came unexpected
abuses. Many corporations and individuals found ways to profit from un-
intended loopholes in the regulation. While it is expected that the financial
marketplace will always find ways to profit from the financial instruments
and laws available in the marketplace, the loopholes found and used in
many cases were fraudulent or contrary to the intent of the SEC when it
adopted the regulation.96 Unfortunately, these abuses tainted the validity of
Regulation S as a qualified and efficient means for raising capital overseas
and eventually led the Commission to amend the regulation in its entirety.97
IV. REGULATORY PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS IN THE MARKETPLACE
INVOLVING OFFERINGS UNDER REGULATION S
Regulation S was intended to be used by financially sound, domestic
corporations for the placement of securities with long-term offshore in-
vestors. 9' In this capacity, the regulation was designed to allow and en-
courage domestic issuers to compete in the global marketplace. However,
only a year after the adoption of Regulation S, the SEC filed its first en-
forcement action involving securities violations associated with the regula-
tion.99 Other enforcement actions soon followed, and it became apparent
94 R. Brandon Asbill, Securities Regulation - Great Expectations and the Reality of Rule
144A and Regulation S; The SEC's Approach to the Internationalization of the Financial
Marketplace, 21 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 145, 161-62 (1991).
See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
9 See generally Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Securities Act Release No.
33-7190, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,663, 35,665 (June 27, 1995) [hereinafter Problematic Practices
Release].
97 See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
98See Cohen, supra note 3, at Cl.
9 See SEC v. Westdon Holding & Inv., Inc., Securities Act Litigation Release No.
13,085, 50 SEC Docket 229 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1991). In Westdon, the SEC filed a civil in-
junctive action against Westdon Holding & Investment Inc. ("Westdon") and others, alleg-
ing that Westdon had purchased a large amount of unregistered securities at a fraction of the
market price from an issuer in reliance on Regulation S. See id. at 229. According to the
allegations by the SEC, Westdon, a Delaware corporation with offices in Rotterdam, Neth-
erlands, had agreed with the issuer that such shares would not be resold by Westdon for five
years. See id. However, immediately upon receiving the shares, Westdon allegedly began
taking steps to illegally distribute the unregistered shares to unsuspecting purchasers in the
United States without the benefit of any valid exemption from registration. See id. Seven
days after the SEC filed the case, the court issued a preliminary injunction and asset freeze
against Westdon and others named as defendants. See SEC v. Westdon Holding & Inv.,
Inc., Securities Act Litigation No. 13,088, 50 SEC Docket 307 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1991).
On June 5, 1992, the Court entered a Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction against one of
the defendants. See SEC v. Westdon Holding & Inv., Inc., Securities Act Litigation Release
No. 13,263, 51 SEC Docket 1060 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 5, 1992). The defendant consented to the
entry of a final judgment without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations and was en-
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that there were loopholes in the regulation that exposed it to various
abuses. Concerns on Wall Street also began to focus on the regulation's
impact on the stock market. It is important to analyze these regulatory and
marketplace concerns that, directly and indirectly, led to amendments in
Regulation S. Close attention to these factors should provide some insight
as to whether the amended regulation will fare better than its predecessor.
A. Regulatory Problems Involving Regulation S
1. Illegal Resales Within the Restricted Period
The most basic securities violation that can occur under Regulation S
is the resale of Regulation S securities back into the United States prior to
the end of a restricted period."° Any such resale, absent an exemption or
registration, is a clear violation of the regulation. 1"' Nevertheless, foreign
purchasers will sometimes ignore these restricted periods and sell their se-
curities back into the United States without waiting out the holding periods
required under Regulation S. "'
The securities profession needs to be aware of transactions involving
securities offered under Regulation S because liability can arise when the
restricted periods are not respected. Such liability occurred in 1996 when
the regulatory arm of the National Association of Securities Dealers (the
NASD) fined a broker $150,000 because one of its customers bought
Regulation S shares and sold them back in the United States through the
broker's accounts before the end of their respective restricted periods. 3
The broker was fined for failing to make the required "affirmative determi-
nation" that they would not be within the restricted periods before execut-
ing the sales."'
joined from engaging in future violations of the Securities and Exchange Act. See id. at
1060.
100 The restricted period is generally 40 days for Category Two issuers and one year for
Category Three issuers. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(c)(2)(iii),
230.903(c)(3)(iii)(A) (1990).
10, See id. § 230.903(c)(2)(iii); § 230.903(c)(3)(iii)(A).
10, See Gretchen Morgenson, Foreign Stock Sales: Don't Get Blindsided, WORTH, Mar.
1994, at 37. Given that securities offered under Regulation S are often sold at rewarding
discounts to the prevailing market price, any immediate resale will usually guarantee re-
warding profits. See id. at 38.
0I In re Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., No. CMS 960084 AWC (NASD). The broker had
executed 117 transactions for the customer that violated the regulation. See id. See also
Brett D. Fromson, Alex. Brown Broker Fined by NASD; Trading Involved Class of Stock
Intended to be Sold Outside U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at C3; Alex. Brown Fined
$100,000 for Regulation SSales, DERIVATVES LrmG. REP., Oct. 14, 1996, at 9.
11 See Deborah Lohse, NASD Regulators Fine Alex. Brown, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1996, at
C13. This sanction marked the first time the NASD's regulatory body, NASD Regulation
Inc., has taken disciplinary action in connection with the sale of Regulation S securities. See
id. Elisse B. Walter, the chief operating officer with NASD Regulation Inc. at the time,
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:58 (1998)
2. Creation and Use of Phony Offshore Shell Entities as a Means for
Selling Unregistered Securities in the United States
An abuse of Regulation S that has SEC enforcement and criminal im-
plications is the formation and use of phony offshore shell entities as a
means for an issuer or distributor to directly profit from the sale of unreg-
istered securities in the United States. In this type of scheme, Regulation S
is cited as the basis for selling securities to offshore shell entities formed
by the issuer or distributor." The offshore shell entities then hold onto the
securities for the duration of the restricted period. At the end of the re-
stricted period the offshore shell entities then sell the Regulation S shares
into the United States with the proceeds from the sale making their way, di-
rectly or indirectly, to the issuer or distributor."° The SEC has found that
such transactions do not qualify for the Regulation S safe harbors because
they are nothing more than "sham offshore transactions" designed to evade
the registration requirements of the Securities Act.0 7
In SEC v. Sofipoint, Inc.,' °8 the SEC charged Softpoint Inc. (Softpoint)
and its officers with, among other things, participating in a series of trans-
actions selling unregistered Regulation S securities in the United States and
disguising the proceeds as earnings from corporate sales. 9 To facilitate
this complex scheme, the SEC alleged, Softpoint issued Regulation S secu-
rities to offshore distributors that it formed and/or controlled."0 Softpoint
then directed the sale of these securities by the foreign distributors back
into the United States."' Softpoint, in turn, received the proceeds from the
warned that "this settlement makes it clear that all NASD member firms are responsible for
educating their staffs about the need to prevent abuses associated with Regulation S offer-
ings." Bill Atkinson, NASD Fines Alex. Brown over Rules Violation, BALT. SuN, Oct. 1,
1996, at Cl. The NASD had no jurisdiction over the customer because the person was not a
NASD member or a registered representative. See Fromson, supra note 103, at C3. See
generally Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, Securities Act Release
No. 33-4445, 27 Fed. Reg. 1415 (Feb. 2, 1962) (discussing the standards of conduct ex-
pected of broker-dealers in the distribution of unregistered securities).
" Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664.
106 See id.
,07 See id. Therefore these transactions constitute violations of Section 5. Securities Act
of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
" SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 14480, 59 SEC Docket 426
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1995).
'09 See id. at 426.
1 " See id. It was alleged that most, if not all, of these foreign entities were non-operating
shell companies which were secretly formed, owned, and/or controlled by Sofipoint's Presi-
dent and Chairman of the Board at the time. See id. See also In the Matter of Donald J.
Stoecklein, Securities Act Release No. 7207, Exchange Act Release No. 36,177, 60 SEC
Docket 327 (Sept. 1, 1995).
.See Sofipoint, Inc., 59 SEC Docket at 426.
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sale and then falsely claimed them as earnings generated from product
sales."'2
In granting the SEC's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court pre-
siding over the Sofipoint case warned that Regulation S sheltered only bona
fide overseas transactions."' The court stated that Regulation S was not a
"haven" for foreign stock distributions that were conducted as part of a
plan to evade the registration requirements under the Securities Act."4 Ac-
cordingly, the court found that Softpoint was not engaged in bona fide
overseas transactions and, therefore, did not fall under the safe harbor pro-
visions under Regulation S.115
In United States v. Sung,"6 a former chairman and chief executive of a
corporation that established sham offshore shell entities as a means for
profiting from the sale of Regulation S securities in the United States was
convicted of securities fraud."' This was the first criminal conviction re-
lated to a scheme involving Regulation S."'
In Sung, between January and March 1992, the chairman of Members
Service Corporation (Members), Arthur Feher, Jr., had the corporation is-
sue 1,411,000 shares of unregistered common stock pursuant to Regulation
S under the names of a 95-year-old woman who lived with Feher and seven
"1 See id. Under the specific charges brought by the SEC in this case, Softpoint, Inc.
("Softpoint") disclosed in its reports that it had generated $4.4 million in revenue from sales
of its software to six foreign distributors in 1992 and 1993. See id. All of these sales were
fictitious, and at least three of the six foreign distributors were formed and controlled by
certain Softpoint officers. See id. Sofipoint had issued 420,000 shares of stock under
Regulation S to these foreign distributors, purportedly in exchange for "marketing rights."
See id. The Softpoint officers then orchestrated the sale of most of the Regulation S stock
through these foreign distributors and back into the United States without registering the
sale. See id. The sale generated approximately $1.72 million in proceeds, of which $1.34
million were remitted to Softpoint. See id. Sofrpoint then applied these proceeds to the out-
standing accounts receivables associated with the fictitious software sales of $4.4 million
and reported in its public filings and press releases that it was collecting on the outstanding
accounts receivables due from the foreign distributors. See id.
See SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
114 See id.
I"1 See id. In connection with the Softpoint scheme, an attorney settled with the SEC,
agreeing to cease and desist from committing future violations of the securities laws and to
pay disgorgement in the amount of $19,975. See In the Matter of Donald J. Stoecklein, su-
pra note 110, at 327. The attorney was the brother of one of the Softpoint officers. See id.
An accountant was also sanctioned by the SEC in connection with his role in auditing public
financial statements filed by Softpoint with the SEC. See In the Matter of Duane V.
Midgley, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 36,229, 60 SEC Docket 547 (Sept. 14, 1995).
Without admitting or denying the Commission's findings, both the attorney and the ac-
countant submitted offers of settlement which the Commission accepted. See id. at 547.
116 United States v. Sung, SEC Litigation Release No. 14901, 61 SEC Docket 2275
(M.D. Fla. May 6, 1996).
11
7 See id. at 2275.
1s See Jay Palmer, First Time Loser: Executive Convicted of Fraud in Reg S Case,
BARRON'S, May 13, 1996, at 14.
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Bahamian shell companies secretly established by Feher."9 Feher and his
accomplices then manipulated the stock price upwards by issuing false
press releases and misleading financial statements.120 Once the stock price
was high enough, Feher and his accomplices sold the stock into the United
States market for approximately $5.5 million.' 2' The outrageous circum-
stances underlying the Sung scheme attracted publicity concerning abuses
of the regulation and generated increased criticism of the regulation's role
in the marketplace." Nevertheless, violations using this type of scheme
continue to occur."
,,9 See Sung, 61 SEC Docket at 2275. Feher listed the 95-year-old woman as a Canadian
national and set up an address for her at a mail stop in Canada. See Al Lewis, Predators
Sniff out Loophole, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 21, 1996, at B 1.
20 See Sung, 61 SEC Docket at 2275. Feher manipulated the price of Members' com-
mon stock by substantially overstating corporate assets in SEC filings and by issuing false
and misleading press releases concerning the Members' business operations. See id. These
misleading press releases and financial statements led the stock price to rise from $4 per
share in March 1992 to approximately $12 per share in June 1992. See id. See also Jaye
Scholl, Easy Money - How Foreign Investors Profit at the Expense of Americans,
BARRON'S, Apr. 29, 1996, at 31.
2, See Sung, 61 SEC Docket at 2275. The SEC recently filed a civil action for alleged
securities violations associated with the scheme involved in this case. See SEC v. Members
Service Corporation, SEC Litigation Release No. 15,371, 64 SEC Docket 1622 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1997). See also David Banes, B.C. Securities Firm Facing U.S. Civil Suit: SEC
Alleges that Union Securities and a Former Employee Aided Stock Manipulators,
VANcOUvER SuN, Jul. 5, 1997, at BI. The SEC also instituted administrative proceedings
against several accountants involved in the auditing of Members's financial statements dur-
ing the time period relevant to the scheme in this case. See In the Matter of Kenneth
O'Neal, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 39,314, 65 SEC Docket 1866 (Nov. 7, 1997).
Without admitting or denying the allegations, the accountants submitted offers of settlement
to the Commission consenting to the issuance of an order denying them the privilege of ap-
pearing or practicing before the Commission as accountants for at least three years. See id.
at 1866.
11 See generally Scholl, supra note 120, at 33-34; Danielle Herubin, PSSSST! Wanna
Buy Some Cheap Stock, PALM BEACH POST, Jun. 1, 1997, at Fl; and Gary Weiss, The Mob
on Wall Street, Bus. WK., Dec. 16, 1996, at 92.
" The SEC recently filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that a former presi-
dent of an issuer and others engaged in a fraudulent scheme to distribute shares purportedly
issued under Regulation S to a fictitious foreign investor. See SEC v. Marc A. Osheroff,
SEC Litigation Release No. 15,719, 66 SEC Docket 2531 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 1998). It is
alleged that within days or weeks after these shares were issued, most of these shares were
deposited into U.S. brokerage accounts opened in the fictitious investor's name. See id.
These shares were then allegedly sold at prevailing market prices. See id. The complaint
filed by the Commission also alleges that a series of false press releases were issued to in-
crease the price of the stock while the distribution was underway. See id. In another recent
case, the SEC filed a complaint against several individuals alleging, among other things, that
the former president and vice-president of a corporation were involved in a fraudulent
scheme involving the "unregistered distribution" of the corporation's common stock "pur-
portedly issued pursuant to Regulation S through foreign shell companies" controlled by the
former president of the corporation. SEC v. Simon M. Rosenfeld, SEC Litigation Release
No. 15,274, 64 SEC Docket 80 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1997).
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3. Use of Promissory Notes in Purchasing Regulation S Securities When
the Expectation ofRepayment Stems from the Resale of Securities in the
United States
Another abuse of Regulation S involves the use of promissory notes.
In this type of scheme, a foreigner will purchase discounted Regulation S
shares simply by signing a short-term, interest-free promissory note. The
foreign holder, who in effect got the shares for nothing, will then wait out
the restricted period (usually 40 days) and sell the shares into the U.S. mar-
ket at the end of the restricted period. 24 The proceeds from this sale will
then be used to pay off the promissory note and the foreigner will profit
from the proceeds left over, usually the difference between the discounted
purchase price and the prevailing market price at the time of the sale."z
The SEC has considered such a use of promissory notes, for all or almost
all of the purchase price where the expectation of repayment stems from
the resale of securities into the U.S. market, as transactions in which the
Regulation S securities never left the United States, as a matter of sub-
stance as opposed to form.126
In the case of In the Matter of Candie's, Inc., 27 the SEC instituted ad-
ministrative proceedings against two issuers, a law firm, and the president
of a brokerage firm, for alleged violations of the securities laws involving
the use of promissory notes in the purchase of Regulation S securities.12 1 In
this case, two issuers sold stock under Regulation S through a New York
law firm and brokerage firm to several foreign companies at substantial
discounts to the prevailing market price in return for short-term, unsecured
promissory notes due in 40 to 70 days. 29 These foreign companies then re-
sold the stock in the United States through the New York brokerage firm
once the restricted periods ended and used a portion of the proceeds from
the sale of the stock to pay off the promissory notes.130 The SEC found
these offerings in reliance on Regulation S to constitute schemes to evade
the registration requirements and therefore not offers and sales outside of
the United States for purposes of Regulation S." The Commission stated
124 Scholl, supra note 120, at 34.
,1 See id. In essence, the foreign purchaser receives a nice profit without having to put
in any capital toward the purchase of Regulation S shares. See id.
126 Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664.
127 See In the Matter of Candie's, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7263, 61 SEC Docket
758 (Feb. 21, 1996). All four respondents submitted offers of settlement which the Com-
mission accepted. See id. at 758. The respondents submitted these offers without admitting
or denying the allegations by the Commission. See id.
121 See id. at 759.
'29 See id.
130 See id.
131 Id. at 761. The SEC noted that the investment risk in each transaction never shifted to
the offshore purchaser. See id. The SEC also characterized this type of transaction as run-
ning afoul of Preliminary Note 2. See id. See also Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. Pre-
liminary Note 2 (1990).
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stated that, in essence, the foreign purchasers were acting as "mere con-
duits" for the sale of unregistered securities in the United States. 32
The Candie's case is unique in that for one of the first times under
Regulation S the SEC found violations under the regulation where there
was no apparent fraud or blatant violation of the regulation itself.'33 Rather
the SEC looked at Preliminary Note 2 of Regulation S and interpreted the
transactions involved in the Candie's case to constitute schemes designed
to evade the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
34
4. Use of the Resale Safe Harbor to "Wash Off" Restrictions from Oth-
erwise Restricted Securities
A problem uniquely associated with the resale safe harbor involves in-
vestors taking restricted securities that cannot be sold publicly in the
United States and using the resale safe harbor as a means to engage in off-
shore transactions solely to wash off restrictions from these otherwise re-
stricted securities. 35 In a release outlining problematic practices in the
regulation (Problematic Practices Release), the SEC condemned this prac-
tice by expressly stating that the resale safe harbor could not be used for
the purposes of washing off resale restrictions, such as the holding period
requirement for restricted securities under Rule 144.136 The SEC warned
that when persons sell restricted securities in offshore transactions and re-
place them with repurchases of fungible unrestricted securities, that the re-
placement securities will be subject to the same restrictions as those
replaced.
37
132 Candie's, 61 SEC Docket at 761.
131 See Chris Gaudio, SEC Sanctions Law Firm as Part of Reg S Settlement, COMPLIANCE
REPORTER, Mar. 4, 1996, at 1.
114 Candie's, 61 SEC Docket at 761.
13' Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664. The SEC noted that there
was a practice in which investors were taking restricted stock that could not be sold in the
United States offshore and "arranging sales solely in order to wash restrictions off the shares
before bringing them back to the U.S." Cohen, supra note 3, at Cl (quoting former SEC
Commissioner Richard Y. Roberts).
' See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664; Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. §
230.144(d) (1997).
... See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664. The Commission reiter-
ated this position again in a no-action letter subsequent to the Problematic Practices Release
when it stated that the resale safe harbor could not be used for the purposes of washing off
resale restrictions. See In Touch Global, LLC [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,209, at 77,038-39 (Nov. 14, 1995). This letter dealt with the issue of
whether restrictions on resales under Rule 502(d) of Regulation D would apply to resales of
securities outside of the United States by persons other than the issuer, distributor or any of
their affiliates. See id. at 77,037. The Commission warned that the resale safe harbor could
not be used to wash off restrictions of otherwise restricted securities. See id at 77,039. See
also HAFT, supra note 44, at 2-12.
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5. Use of Hedging as a Means to Lock in Profits Associated with Dis-
counted Purchases Under Regulation S
Another abuse of Regulation S involves the practice of hedging or
short selling. In this type of scheme, an offshore investor will purchase a
set amount of Regulation S shares at a discount to the prevailing market
price. The offshore investor will then immediately sell short the same
amount of shares at the prevailing market price. In essence, the investor
has locked in a profit of the difference between the prevailing market price
versus the discounted purchase price for the Regulation S securities with-
out having to incur any of the investment risks associated with waiting out
the restricted period. When the offshore investor finally has to close out
his short positions, he simply waits for the restricted period to end, sells the
Regulation S shares back into the United States at the market price and
then uses the proceeds to cover his short positions with purchases of the
same amount of shares at the same market price (a wash).'38 The SEC has
found this type of practice involving an investment fund to constitute vio-
lations of the securities laws in the case of In the Matter of GFL Ultra
Fund Ltd.13 9
In GFL Ultra Fund, the SEC instituted administrative proceedings
against a British Virgin Islands corporation which had a fund (the "Fund")
that had adopted a primary strategy of immediately short selling Regulation
S shares purchased at a discount.4 ' The strategy specifically involved "(i)
purchasing for cash securities overseas which had been issued at substan-
tial discounts and without registration pursuant to Regulation S; (ii) hedg-
138 An example of how this works with numbers can be played out in the following sim-
ple scenario. Someone purchases one hundred shares of Regulation S securities, worth
$10/share at the prevailing market price, for the discounted price of $7/share, a total invest-
ment of $700. Then he immediately sells short one hundred shares at the $10/share pre-
vailing market price for $1000. He thus locks in a profit of $3/share or $300. This is the
same amount of profit he would have realized if he had sold his discounted shares for the
prevailing market price immediately after he purchased them. However, in the short selling
scenario, the investor still must unwind and cover his short positions by purchasing the
number of shares that he sold short, or one hundred shares. To do this, the investor simply
waits until the restricted period ends on his Regulation S shares. If the prevailing market
price drops to $8/share, he sells the hundred shares originally purchased through the Regu-
lation S offering at the prevailing market price ($8/share), then purchases the same number
of shares at the prevailing market price ($8/share) to cover his short positions for a wash.
The investor thus loses nothing when he finally has to cover his short positions. Instead, he
has hedged and secured the locked-in profits by short selling immediately after purchasing
Regulation S shares, with none of the inherent risks associated with waiting out the re-
stricted period.
In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333,
64 SEC Docket 1958 (June 18, 1997). GFL Ultra Fund Ltd. submitted an Offer of Settle-
ment which the Commission accepted, consenting to entry of the SEC's findings and the
imposition of a cease-and-desist order without admitting or denying the allegations by the
Commission. See id. at 1958.
1
4 0 See id. at 1958-59.
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ing some or all of those securities through short selling in the United States
before and/or during the 40 day restricted period under Regulation S... ;
and (iii) unwinding the short positions, which involved covering the short
positions using the Regulation S shares or selling the Regulation S shares
in the open market in the United States after the 40 day restricted period
had expired."14 ' The SEC noted that this "strategy resulted in a profit for
the Fund when the Fund unwound its positions" and found that the Fund
had virtually locked in its profits when it engaged in its short positions. 42
The SEC specifically found the Fund to have violated Section 5 of the Se-
curities Act by not registering "the Regulation S securities which it sold
into the United States either by covering its short positions with the Regu-
lation S shares or by directly selling the Regulation S shares (and purchas-
ing freely-trading stock to cover the short positions)."'4 The SEC further
surmised the covering of a short position to be the equivalent of a "sale"
for purposes of the Section 5 registration requirements.'"
The Commission stated that there were no exemptions which the Fund
could rely on to avoid the registration requirements.'45 The SEC specifi-
cally found that Section 4(1) which exempts "transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer" did not apply in this case be-
cause the Fund was a "statutory underwriter" under Section 2(11) of the
Securities Act. 41 The term "underwriter" under Section 2(11) is defined to
include any person who has purchased securities from an issuer with a
"view" towards the "distribution" of the securities. 47 The SEC stated that
' Id. "The Fund participated in 90 Regulation S deals involving the common stock of
47 issuers and engaged in a short selling strategy with respect to some or all of the Regula-
tion S shares purchased in 62 of these deals. The Fund generally purchased the Regulation
S shares at a 15% to 20% discount to the prevailing market price." Id. at 1959.
142 Id. at 1959. In this case the SEC provided the following example of how the strategy
operated in the Fund's case.
The Fund purchased 300,000 Regulation S shares from Zitel on December 12, 1994 at a
discount of approximately 15% to the freely tradable share price. The Fund partially
hedged these Regulation S shares by selling short 279,800 shares in five brokerage ac-
counts between November 14, 1994, and January 19, 1995, in connection with this pur-
chase of Regulation S shares. The Fund locked in a profit (the differential between theprice at which the 279,800 shares were sold short net of commissions and the price at
which the 279,800 Regulation S shares were purchased) of$816,43075. By February 7,
1995, the Fund had distributed all of its ZitelRegulation S shares into the United States




43 Id. at 1960.
144 See id.
145 See id.
116 Id. See also Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994); Securities Act
of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1994). The term underwriter means "any person who
has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers and sells for an issuer in connection
with, the distribution of any security . .. ." Securities Act of 1993 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(I 1) (1994).
1
47GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1960.
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"when the Fund either covered its short positions with the unregistered
Regulation S shares or sold the unregistered Regulation S shares directly
into the United States markets (and purchased freely-trading shares to
cover its short positions), the shares were 'distributed"' within the meaning
of the definition of an underwriter, because "substantial numbers of shares
flowed into the trading markets."'48 The SEC therefore reasoned that the
Fund had purchased Regulation S shares with a view towards distribution,
thus making it a statutory underwriter.'49 Because the Fund was considered
an underwriter of the shares, rather than solely an investor in them, it was
required to register the shares before reselling them and Section 4(1) could
not apply as an exemption. 5
The Commission broadly stated in the GFL Ultra Fund case that a
"trading pattern of short selling in the United States in connection with
purchasing in a Regulation S offering, which essentially locks in a profit, ..
. runs counter to the goals of Regulation S. '' 5 The SEC also expressed this
position prior to the GFL Ultra Fund case in its Problematic Practices Re-
lease and in another release which proposed amendments to Regulation S
("Proposed Amendments Release"). 2
Former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman, dissenting in the GFL
Ultra Fund case, felt that there was too much confusion regarding the
Commission's views on hedging in securities offered under Regulation S at
the time that the Fund had engaged in its hedging transactions. 53 IHe noted
that the Fund had already ceased its trading strategy when the Commission
espoused its formal views in the Problematic Practices Release and the
Proposed Amendments Release, both of which expressed concerns about
the use of hedging under the regulation.5 4 Commissioner Wallman did not
construe the Fund's activities to be proper; however, given the lack of
guidance by the Commission surrounding these types of trading activities,
he felt that an "after the fact" enforcement action was not warranted in this
case.1
55
'4 8 Id. at 1961.
149 See id. See also Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1994).
"0 GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1960; Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. §
77(d)(1) (1994). See also Floyd Norris, SEC Orders Offshore Fund to Halt U.S. Stock Re-
sale, N.Y. TIMEs, Jun. 19, 1997, at D20. Distributions by a statutory underwriter have to be
registered under Section 5. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969). See also Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96,
at 35664.
's' GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1961.
152 See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664. See also Offshore Offers
and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-7392, 62 Fed. Reg. 9258 (Feb. 28, 1997) [herein-
after Proposed Amendments Release].
' GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1961-62.
154 Id.
"5' Id. at 1962-63. See also Norris, supra note 150, at D20; GFL Ultra Fund Cited in
Allegations by SEC on 'Offshore' Securities, WALL ST. J., Jun. 19, 1997, at B16.
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The question left open is whether an individual investor could also be
held liable under the securities laws for hedging or short selling Regulation
S securities. The GFL Ultra Fund case specifically found the Fund in-
volved to be a statutory underwriter involved in short selling that could not
claim an exemption under Section 4(1) which would generally exempt eve-
ryone except an issuer, underwriter or dealer.'56 An individual investor
would appear to fall under Section 4(1). However, given the broad lan-
guage in the GFL Ultra Fund case that a pattern of short selling in connec-
tion with a Regulation S offering "runs counter to the goals of Regulation
S," "' an individual who engages in enough short selling transactions in-
volving securities covered by Regulation S might be considered an under-
writer, thus would not be exempt from registration. Therefore, the GFL
Ultra Fund case might apply not only to investment companies or securi-
ties professionals but also to individual investors who engage in short sell-
ing transactions in connection with purchases of securities under
Regulation S.
The GFL Ultra Fund case is unique in that, while technically the
Commission found the Fund's actions to be those of a statutory underwriter
subject to registration, the Comfnission's decision is so broad as to imply
that hedging and short selling in connection with Regulation S may be im-
permissible altogether. This ruling met with criticism in the legal and se-
curities communities. Former Commissioner of the SEC Edward H.
Fleischman criticized the GFL Ultra Fund decision, stating that the SEC
had deemed "hedging" to be illegal.' He attributed the SEC's "own ill re-
gard of Regulation S" and "its traditional suspicion of short sales" as fac-
tors underlying the GFL Ultra Fund decision.'59 He also noted that consent
orders, such as the one involved in the GFL Ultra Fund case, hold very lit-
tle precedential weight in the courts. 1"
Whether the SEC sought to declare hedging illegal is unknown. What
is certain is that the form of hedging at issue in the GFL Ultra Fund case is
another loophole in the regulation that the Commission never intended.
The financial marketplace heard about this risk free type of trading activity
which guaranteed profits (hedging through discounted Regulation S pur-
chases) and utilized it as any other type of market instrument that ensures
profits. The Commission did not like this unanticipated use of Regulation
16 GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1960. See also Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15
U.S.C. § 77(d)(1) (1994).
157 GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1961.
'
5 8 See Edward H. Fleischman, A History Lesson for the SEC, N.Y. TIMEs, Jun. 29, 1997,
§ 3, at 14. Mr. Fleischman was one of the Commissioners who voted on Regulation S when
it was adopted in 1990.
159 See id.
160 See id.
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S and specifically addressed closing this loophole in its proposed amend-
ments to Regulation S."
The multitude of enforcement actions brought by the SEC for viola-
tions associated with Regulation S spawned bad publicity for the regulation
as a qualified and efficient means of raising capital. 6 This bad publicity
intensified with increasing complaints about the regulation's harmful role
in the domestic marketplace.
B. Concerns in the Marketplace about Regulation S
Aside from the regulatory problems associated with Regulation S,
concerns have also arisen in the marketplace regarding the regulation's
tendency to provide investment advantages to foreign investors. These
concerns have little to do with the specific regulatory and enforcement
problems mandating SEC attention but are important to note because they
can often be attributed directly or indirectly to some of the abuses occur-
ring in the regulation.
There are different attributes associated with securities offered under
Regulation S which have produced a wave of domestic criticism about the
role of the regulation in the marketplace. These attributes, which often re-
inforce each other, have led to complaints about the regulation for several
important reasons.
1. Discounted Shares Offered Solely to Foreigner Purchasers
One of the most widespread complaints about Regulation S is that se-
curities offered under the regulation are frequently sold to foreign purchas-
ers at deep discounts to the prevailing market price. 6 Often, these shares
can be bought for as low as 30 to 40 % below what American investors
pay. 164 Foreigner purchasers enjoy this unique privilege simply because
securities issued under Regulation S cannot be offered to United States in-
vestors.
Some companies offering attractive discounts understandably claim
that such discounts are necessitated by the risks associated with having to
161 Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9265.
2 For other civil actions filed by the SEC in connection with the improper use and/or
abuse of Regulation S, see SEC v. Michael W. Rehtorik, SEC Litigation Release No.
13,975, 56 SEC Docket 368 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1994); SEC v. Environment Holdings, Inc.,
SEC Litigation Release No. 14,683, 63 SEC Docket 88 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1995); SEC v.
Scorpion Technologies, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 14,814, 61 SEC Docket 749
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1996); SEC v. Steven H. Schiffer, SEC Litigation Release No. 15,435, 65
SEC Docket 337 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1997). Criminal charges involving a scheme relating to
the sale of securities in reliance on Regulation S were also brought by the U.S. Attorney for
the Eastern District of New York. See United States v. Grant R. Curtis, SEC Litigation Re-
lease No. 15,109, 62 SEC Docket 2799 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1996).
6 See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 37; Scholl, supra note 120, at 31.
'"See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 37.
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wait out the restricted periods.'65 Other companies offering such discounts
simply do so because they may be too weak financially to raise money
without slashing their share prices." The Commission has conceded that
some discounts may be warranted given the risks and circumstances asso-
ciated with offerings under the regulation." 7 However, many American in-
vestors have perceived these discounts as providing an unfair market
advantage to foreign investors.'68
2. Lack of Disclosure
Domestic investors have been historically unaware of Regulation S of-
ferings because these offerings were hardly ever disclosed to the public.'69
It was not until the end of 1996 that the Commission finally required re-
porting issuers to report such offerings within fifteen days of occurrence. 70
Prior to this recent disclosure requirement domestic investors never knew
when a Regulation S offering had taken place. "' To this day, shareholders
of nonreporting issuers will still never know when an offering under the
regulation has taken place. Without adequate disclosure often the first clue
a domestic shareholder gets of a Regulation S offering is when there has
been an unexplained drop in the company's share price.'72 This drop usu-
ally occurs just after foreign shareholders have started dumping their shares
back into the U.S. market or once the market has gotten wind of the Regu-
165 See id.
166 See Cohen, supra note 3, at Cl; Scholl, supra note 120, at 33.
167 See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664 n.14. The Commission
has stated that some discounts may be warranted "to compensate for the length of the re-
stricted period, historic volatility of the stock, financial condition of the issuer, the dilution
represented by the newly issued shares, current market condition, availability of current in-
formation as to the issuer, information the issuer may have had that was disclosed to the
purchaser but not otherwise disclosed to the market, or other factors." Id. The Commission
has warned, however, that discounts that are too unrelated to the "economics of the transac-
tion" will run afoul of Regulation S. Id.
16 See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 37. Many American investors have prided them-
selves as having the "fairest markets around." Id. Therefore questions have arisen as to
why issuers can sell discounted Regulation S securities to foreigner purchasers that they
cannot in turn sell to their existing domestic shareholders. See id.
169 See id.; Scholl, supra note 120, at 31.
170 See Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales, Exchange Act Release No.
37801, 62 SEC Docket 2762, 2763 (Oct. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Form 8-K Reporting Re-
lease]. Domestic nonreporting companies are still not required to disclose offerings under
Regulation S. Prior to November 1996, the only hard evidence of a Regulation S offering
by a reporting issuer was when there was an increase in the issuer's shares outstanding. See
Scholl, supra note 120, at 32. "But even then, there was no way of knowing on what terms
the shares were issued." Floyd Norris, The SEC is Set to Undo a Rule that was an Invitation
to Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996, at D8. Furthermore, this type of increase could only be
seen in the issuer's quarterly reports, which often necessitated laser-like scrutiny to find
such a Regulation S deal. See Scholl, supra note 120, at 32.
171 See Form 8-K Reporting Release, supra note 170, at 88,701.
172 See Scholl, supra note 120, at 32.
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lation S offering. 73 By then it is often too late for the domestic shareholder
to salvage the losses. 74 The harmful infusion of securities back into the
U.S. market following the end of a restricted period is another market con-
cern associated with the regulation.
75
3. Dilutive Effects Associated with the Flow of Regulation S Securities
Back into the United States
When an issuer, through a Regulation S offering, increases its market
capitalization by placing more of its shares in the marketplace, the value of
each share shrinks. Under this concept, the existing shareholder of an is-
suer executing a Regulation S offering will have his shares diluted by such
offering. This dilutive effect associated with the issuance of more out-
standing shares is a common fact of life in the financial marketplace.
However, the existing domestic shareholder of a company that has just
completed a Regulation S offering can be at a disadvantage if he does not
know that such an offering has taken place. When the domestic share-
holder does find out, if he does at all, it is usually after foreigner purchasers
have already sold their shares back into the United States and the stock
price has dropped as a result of this influx of shares.'76
Taking into account the discount, lack of disclosure and dilutive mar-
ket attributes of Regulation S all together, the following scenario illustrates
how, prior to recent changes in the regulation, the domestic investor can be
harmed by a Regulation S offering. An issuer will often do a Regulation S
offering overseas at a discount to the prevailing market price, unbeknownst
to its existing domestic shareholders. Once the 40 day or one year re-
stricted period has expired, foreign purchasers, who will want to expectedly
profit off of the discounted shares they have already purchased, will then
immediately sell their shares back into the United States market. This in-
fusion back into the United States of shares formerly held by foreigner pur-
chasers will cause the financial marketplace to react to the dilutive effects
of the incoming shares and the issuer's stock price to fall. The victims will
" See id. See also infra note 178 and accompanying text. Short-sellers are often at-
tracted to Regulation S offerings as indications that a stock's price will go down due to the
dilutive effect of such offerings or as signs of a company's weakening financial state. See
id. Heavy short selling activity in a stock will often cause the stock price to fall. See id.
174 See Scholl, supra note 120, at 32. There have also been complaints that existing
shareholders should know when issuers are selling shares at large discounts because such
discounts could be signs of the issuer's weakening financial state or that something odd is
going on. See generally Norris, supra note 170, at D8; Morgenson, supra note 102, at 38.
Healthy large companies rarely have to mark down their stock price to attract investors. See
Morgenson, supra note 102.
'~' See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 37; Scholl, supra note 120, at 31.
176 See Scholl, supra note 134, at 132.
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be the issuer's existing domestic shareholders who will witness their
shares' decline in value often without even knowing why. 177
The scenario above demonstrates how domestic investors can be
harmed as a result of a Regulation S offering. 78 Despite these harmful
market effects, everything in this scenario can be technically legal from an
issuer's perspective. Companies can issue Regulation S shares at a dis-
count (to a degree), refuse or minimally disclose Regulation S offerings,
and allow the dilutive effects associated with Regulation S offerings occur
unbeknownst to domestic investors. These factors, which compliment each
other to make Regulation S offerings very attractive to foreigner investors,
can be very harmful for domestic shareholders.
V. EVENTS LEADING UP TO AMENDMENTS IN REGULATION S
With the advent of the regulatory abuses and marketplace concerns in
Regulation S, came criticism and scrutiny of the regulation and of those
that abused it. First came cries from the financial community about the un-
fair attributes associated with offerings under Regulation S, then came in-
creased enforcement initiatives by the SEC to mitigate damages caused by
loopholes in the regulation. In the end, the regulation was amended to ad-
dress all of these concerns. Tracing the evolution of events that eventually
led to the amendments will help shed some light on why the regulation was
rewritten the way it was and what it sought to address.
A. Developing Criticism of the Regulation
As early as 1994, the media began to catch on to some of the abusive
practices surrounding the use of Regulation S.179 At the same time, the
SEC was showing signs that it did not like the way that the regulation was
,7 See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 38. In October 1996, the SEC required reporting
issuers to report Regulation S offerings within fifteen days of occurrence. See Form 8-K
Reporting Release, supra note 170. See also infra notes 191-94.
... Ironically, this practice has proven lucrative for some very unpopular players in the
market: short-sellers. Short-sellers often hunt for Regulation S offerings with big discounts
because they deem the company to be in financial trouble, or because they know that the
dilutive effects associated with the flowback of Regulation S securities will kill the stock.
See Gary Weiss, The Secret World of Short-Sellers, Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 1996, at 62. This
sort of short selling activity is generally only associated with Regulation S offerings where
the securities are offered at major discounts. See id. at 78-79. Short-sellers are recom-
mended to specifically look for such Regulation S deals because they are great signs that the
companies share price will go down. See Gary Weiss, How tofind a Stock That's Headed
for Trouble, Bus. WK., Dec. 30, 1996, at 118. The short sales by short-sellers themselves
will also have the effect of driving down the issuer's share price. This type of short selling
activity is not the type of short selling activity that has come under SEC scrutiny in the GFL
Ultra Fund case. See generally GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-
9333, 64 SEC Docket 1958 (June 18, 1997).
'79 See generally Morgenson, supra note 102, Cohen, supra note 3.
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being misused. 18' These developments led U.S. Representative Edward
Markey, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Telecommunica-
tions and Finance subcommittee to write the SEC in April 1994 and request
a report to Congress as to whether the regulation should be repealed or sub-
stantially modified.'
The Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, responding to Representative
Markey's letter several weeks later, confirmed that the Commission was
aware of abuses of the regulation that were occurring."12 He advised that
the Commission was in the process of determining "the most effective
method to address" abuses in the regulation and indicated that the Commis-
sion's review could result in revision of the regulation itself or in increased
enforcement initiatives targeted against abusers in the regulation.'
'80 At the Practising Law Institute's annual "SEC Speaks" conference on March 5, 1994,
Elisse Walter, then Deputy Director of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance, indicated
that misuse of the rules governing Regulation S had become a "very problematic area."
SEC's Walter Highlights Concern over Application of Regulation S, 26 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 366 (Mar. 11, 1994) (quoting Elisse Walter). Linda Quinn, Director of the SEC's
Division of Corporate Finance, also cautioned that if people were "playing games" that the
SEC was "going to find them" and take action. Karen Donovan, SEC Officials Outline
Agency's Agenda, NAT'L. L.L, Mar. 21, 1994, at B I (quoting Linda Quinn). At a District of
Columbia Bar gathering on March 8, 1994, Quinn again warned that the SEC had heard too
many reports of people "pushing the envelope" of the Regulation S safe harbors and cau-
tioned that the SEC would be "out and about looking at what's going on" in the Regulation
S area. Issuers' Pushing Envelope ofReg S Safe Harbor, Quinn Warns, 26 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 355-56 (Mar. 11, 1994) (quoting Linda Quinn). See also Samuel Wolff, Recent
Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23 DENy. L INT'L L. & PoL'Y 347,
353 (1995).
"8I See Letter from Rep. Edward Markey to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt (Apr. 27, 1994)
[hereinafter Markey Letter]. See also Markey Seeks Report on Regulation S, 26 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 636 (Apr. 29, 1997); Markey Calls on SEC to Review Regulation S, CORP.
Fin. WK., May 2, 1994, at 14. Representative Markey was the House lawmaker most
closely involved with oversight of the securities industry at the time. Markey Calls on SEC
to Review Regulation S, CoRP. FrN. WK., May 2, 1994, at 14. In his letter to SEC Chairman
Levitt, Representative Markey stated that he was "extremely concerned about indications of
widespread abuses associated with Regulation S offerings." Id. (citing Markey Letter). He
directed the SEC to examine whether some Regulation S sales were being done solely to
evade the registration requirements and for an analysis on the incentives that Regulation S
creates for foreign purchasers to drive down share prices in U.S. companies through short
sales. See id.
.8. Letter from SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt to Rep. Edward Markey (May 6, 1994)
[hereinafter Levitt Response]. The Division of Enforcement and the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance were the two Divisions within the SEC that were involved in a coordinated re-
view of offerings under Regulation S. See id.. See also SEC Staff Reviewing Best Way to
Deal with Reg S Offshore Offering Problems, 26 SEC. RaG. & L. REP. (BNA) 696 (May 13,
1994); Washington Roundup, SEc. WK., May 16, 1994, at 4; SEC Works on Way to Halt
some Trading in Special Instances, WALL ST. J., 1994 WL-WSJ 291861, May 18, 1994.
83 Levitt Response, supra note 182. See also Wolff, supra note 180, at 354.
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B. Problematic Practices Release
In June 1995 the Commission published its views on what it deemed
to be abuses of Regulation S in an interpretive release entitled "Problematic
Practices under Regulation S. '84 In this release, the Commission focused
on Preliminary Note 2 of the regulation which stated that Regulation S was
not available "with respect to any transaction or series of transactions that,
although in technical compliance" with the regulation was "part of a plan
or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the Act."'85 The Commis-
sion warned that there were circumstances which indicated that securities
were being placed offshore temporarily to evade the registration require-
ments of the Act and noted that these types of transactions ran afoul of
Preliminary Note 2.186 Transactions specified by the Commission as being
violative of the regulation included the illicit use of promissory notes and
phony offshore shell entities, hedging activities involving purchases of
Regulation S securities at large discounts, and the use of the resale safe
harbor as a means for washing off restrictions from otherwise restricted se-
curities."8 7
The Commission requested comment on whether Regulation S should
be amended and suggestions of ways to curb abuses in the regulation. One
of the suggestions left for comment was a proposal to extend the 40 day re-
stricted period to a full year and impose Category Three restrictions on
Category Two securities.'8 8 It was also questioned whether there should be
limits on the amount of discounts that could be offered."8 9 Comment was
further requested on whether restrictions should be implemented to prohibit
hedging activities and the use of promissory notes in transactions involving
securities issued under Regijlation S. °
C. Fifteen Day Reporting Requirement for Regulation S Offerings
Recognizing the dilutive effects and potential abuse problems that the
lack of disclosure inherent under Regulation S offerings posed, in October
1996 the Commission adopted amendments to the Exchange Act periodic
reporting forms and required domestic reporting issuers to disclose offer-
1 Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,663. Through this Release the
Commission requested comments as to whether Regulation S should be amended to "limit
its vulnerability to abuse." Id.
'
85 Id. See also Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. Preliminary Note 2 (1990).
116 See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664. Such circumstances re-
sulted when the ownership of the securities never left the U.S. market, a substantial portion
of the economic risk was left in or returned to the U.S. market during the restricted period,
or the transaction was such that "there was no reasonable expectation that the securities
could be viewed as coming to rest abroad." Id.
1871d.
.. See id. at 35,665.
189 See id.
190 See id.
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ings made under the regulation.'' The SEC mandated that all Regulation S
offerings by domestic reporting issuers be disclosed on a Form 8-K within
fifteen days of the offering. 92 With the adoption of this new reporting re-
quirement Chairman Levitt declared that Regulation S was "one safe har-
bor with too many pirates in it."'" He also warned that the markets were
"on notice" that he was "committed to addressing these abuses more di-
rectly," but conceded that this recent action alone was "not a cure for what
ails" Regulation S.'94
D. Proposed Amendments to Regulation S
In February 1997, the Commission published for comment proposed
amendments to Regulation S.' In the proposals, the Commission recom-
mended lengthening to two years the restricted period for domestic issuers
and foreign issuers with a principal market in the United States.'96 The
purpose of instituting this new two year restricted period was to align the
91 Form 8-K Reporting Release, supra note 170, at 2763. The revisions were designed
"to address abusive practices in connection with the sale of equity securities by domestic
companies in purported Regulation S offerings by requiring more disclosure about such
sales in a timely fashion." Id. The Commission stated that the "markets have been unaware
of the potential dilution or the effects on the financial condition of the issuer" that Regula-
tion S sales could cause. Id. The Commission also noted that the "lack of a specific disclo-
sure requirement may be permitting" abusive practices by some U.S. issuers. Id.
192 See id. at 2764. The Commission required a current reporting under a Form 8-K
within 15 days of a Regulation S sale, rather than quarterly reporting under a Form 10-Q,
due to concerns that quarterly reporting would not be timely enough for Regulation S sales
because, under the Regulation S 40 day restricted period for "sales of equity securities by
domestic reporting companies, the restricted period could expire, and securities could be re-
sold in the U.S. market before disclosure is made." Id. The Commission acknowledged that
it could later extend the restricted period for Category Two issuers in an Amended Regula-
tion S and stated that "if the restricted period for sales of equity securities pursuant to
Regulation S is changed, the Commission intends to consider revising the periodic disclo-
sure requirement for Regulation S sales." Id.
191 Brett D. Fromson, SEC tightens Overseas Sales Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at
F3 (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt).
194 Mark H. Anderson, SEC Changes Rule to Curtail Abuses of Offshore Offers, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 10, 1996, at C16 (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt). See also SEC Places
Limits on Offshore Offerings, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1996, at B2.
1s See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152. The Commission expressly
stated that these proposals were "designed to stop abusive practices in connection with of-
ferings of equity securities purportedly made in reliance on Regulation S." Id. at 9258. The
Commission's primary area of concern was the use of Regulation S for sales of equity secu-
rities by domestic issuers. Id. at 9259.
I96 See id. at 9260. The Commission recommended lengthening the restricted period for
Category Two domestic reporting issuers and foreign reporting issuers with a principal mar-
ket in the United States for their securities from 40 days to two years. See id. It likewise
proposed lengthening the restricted period for Category Three domestic nonreporting issuers
and foreign nonreporting issuers with a principal market in the United States for their secu-
rities from one year to two years. See id.
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Regulation S restricted periods with the Rule 144 holding periods. 97 The
Commission also proposed imposing the certification, legending and other
rigorous procedures applicable to securities under Category Three on all
equity securities of domestic issuers and foreign issuers with a principal
market in the United States for their securities. 98
To directly combat some of the regulatory problems associated with
Regulation S, the Commission proposed an entirely new section to the
regulation that would in effect classify equity securities of all domestic and
foreign issuers with a principal market in the United States for their securi-
ties as restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144.199 The Com-
mission further proposed prohibiting the use of promissory notes as
payment for securities offered under Regulation S and to require that pur-
chasers agree not to engage in hedging transactions in these securities."°
197 See id. Rule 144 provides a safe harbor for the resale of restricted and control securi-
ties. See generally Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1997). This rule basically permits per-
sons who hold such securities to publicly sell them without registration and without being
deemed underwriters, if certain conditions are satisfied. Id. In a release contemporaneous
with as the Proposed Amendments Release, the SEC amended the holding period require-
ments under Rule 144. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145,
Securities Act Release 33-7390, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242 (Feb. 20, 1997). The Commission
changed the holding period requirements "to permit the resale of limited amounts of re-
stricted securities by any person after a one-year, rather than two-year holding period." Id.
at 9243. The amendments also permitted "unlimited resales of restricted securities held by
non-affiliates of the issuer after a holding period of two years, rather than three years." Id.19' See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9260-62.
See id. at 9263. The Commission proposed to make it clear in the Regulation that off-
shore resales under the resale safe harbor of equity securities that would be newly defined as
restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144 would not affect the restricted status of
such securities. See id. at 9265. The Commission was seeking to make it understood in the
regulation that the resale safe harbor could not be used to wash off restrictions from other-
wise restricted securities. Id. The Commission proposed providing such a notice under a
new Rule 905. See id. Amendments to Rule 144(a)(3) would also be undertaken to classify
these securities as restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144. See id. Rule
144(a)(3) specifically defines the term restricted securities under Rule 144. Rule 144, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1997). Another release issued simultaneously with the Proposed
Amendments Release noted that the types of securities issued under Regulation S could be
included within the definition of restricted securities under Rule 144. Revision of Rule 144,
Rule 145 and Form 144, Securities Act Release 33-7391, 62 Fed. Reg. 9246, 9249 (Feb. 20,
1997). This release proposing further revisions to Rule 144 accompanied the release
adopting final rules to Rule 144. See generally Revision of Holding Period Requirements in
Rules 144 and 145, supra note 197.
200 See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9262-63, 9265 (concerning
promissory notes and hedging). For purposes of clarification, the Commission likewise
proposed generally to edit the language within the regulation to make it more concise and
understandable. See id. at 9266. These technical and clarifying revisions included: I) re-
vising the captions of the three sections in the issuer safe harbor under Rule 903 to specifi-
cally refer them to their commonly known terminology as "Category 1," "Category 2," and
"Category 3"; 2) revising the issuer safe harbor to state clearly for each category what pro-
cedures are to be followed for each category; 3) combining or moving some of the defini-
tions within Rule 902 into the Rule 903 safe harbor category to make the rule easier to read
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The proposals were greeted with mixed reaction. The Commission
publicly expressed its hopes that an amended Regulation S would curb
abuses associated with the regulation. Chairman Levitt announced that the
Commission had launched a "regulatory armada that should drive most of
the marauders out" of the Regulation S safe harbor.20 1 However, many
commentors to the proposals did not express like enthusiasm. While com-
mending the Commission's efforts in seeking a solution to the ongoing
abuses of Regulation S, many commentors felt that the measures proposed
were excessively restrictive and would significantly impair the ability of
issuers to raise capital under Regulation S. 202 This view was shared by oth-
ers on Wall Street as well as in the domestic and international legal securi-
ties arena.0 3 Some even felt that the SEC was wrongly reacting to what
many had perceived as marketplace advantages that the regulation had cre-
ated for foreigner investors, rather than to regulatory abuses stemming
from violations of the regulation itself.
204
and understand; and 4) generally editing the language in the rule to make it more under-
standable. See id.
21 SEC Proposes to Tighten Safe Harbor Under Reg Sfor Offshore Offerings, 29 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 218 (Feb. 21, 1997) (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt).
202 See Comments of Gary J. Wolfe, Seward & Kissel, New York, Apr. 29, 1997; Com-
ments of John T. Bostelman, Daniel Dunson, Charles F. Rechlin, Mary C. Moynihan, and
David B. Rockwell, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, Apr. 29, 1997; Comments of Richard
E. Gutman, Chairman, Committee on Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of
the New York State Bar Association, Albany, N.Y., Apr. 29, 1997; and Comments of Joseph
McLaughlin, Brown & Wood LLP, New York, May 30, 1997, U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission, SEC Proposed Rules, (visited Aug. 25, 1997)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/propridx.htm>.
203 See Larry Light, Expat Stock May Get Homesick, Bus. WK., Jul. 14, 1997, at 4. The
SEC's proposal for increasing the waiting period to two years set off a "roar of protest from
Wall Street" because of "fears that such a long period would dampen enthusiasm for Regu-
lation S stocks abroad." Id. Also, other countries objected to the newer restrictive proposals
being applied to foreign issuers. See SIA Lobbies Against SEC Stance on Reg S Proposal,
GLOBAL COMPLIANCE REPORTER, Jun. 2, 1997, at 2. The proposals were deemed to create a
disincentive for foreign issuers to list on the U.S. markets. See id.
204 Sara Hanks & Richard Cohn, The Wrong Weapon and the Wrong Target: The SEC's
Recent Proposed Changes to Regulation S, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1997, at 23. Sara Hanks, one of
the authors of the original Regulation S, believed that the potential damage that could result
from the proposals far outweighed any benefit sought by the SEC in stopping the abusive
practices occurring under the regulation. See id. She noted that many U.S. investors per-
ceived that they were being treated worse than foreign investors were, and that the media
had criticized Regulation S because of these concerns in the marketplace. See id. She felt
that it appears to be the "differential treatment for U.S. versus foreign investors that the
Commission [was] reacting to" in setting more stringent requirements under the proposals.
Id.
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VI. AMENDMENTS TO REGULATION S
On February 10, 1998, the Commission adopted amendments to
Regulation S which became effective on April 27, 1998.05 The SEC
passed the amendments on the same day it brought forth proposed rules de-
signed to prevent fraud in the area of micro-cap stocks.2° In doing so, it
apparently took the opportunity to publicize the amendments as part of its
efforts to crack down on micro-cap stock fraud.2°7
In the release accompanying the amendments, the Commission em-
phasized that the amendments were "designed to stop the abusive practices
in connection with offerings of equity securities purportedly made in reli-
ance on Regulation S."20s It noted that most abuses occurring in the regu-
209lation concerned equity securities of domestic issuers. In this regard, the
most drastic changes to the regulation can be seen in those areas that apply
to domestic issuers.
The most important change to the regulation by the amendments was a
reclassification of domestic reporting equity securities to the third issuer
safe harbor category.2 0 Another important change by the amendments was
205 See Amending Release, supra note 4; Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-
230.905 (1998).
' See Registration on Securities on Form S-8, Securities Act Release No. 33-7506, 66
SEC Docket 1069 (Feb. 17, 1998) (proposing amendments to Form S-8 to restrict use of the
form for the sale of securities to consultants and advisors, and to allow use of the form for
the exercise of stock options by family members of employee optionees); Publication or
Submission of Quotations Without Specified Information, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
39670, 66 SEC Docket 1091 (Feb. 17, 1998) (proposing amendments to Rule 15c2-11 to
enhance certain informational requirements for quotations and generally require broker-
dealers to review information about the issuer when they publish a quotation).
207 See Floyd Norris, The SEC Proposes Anti-Fraud Rules for 'Micro-cap' Stocks, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at D8; Tom Lowry, SEC Tightens Restrictions on Offshore Stock Is-
sues, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1998, at B3. The combining of the new amendments as part of
the Commission's micro-cap stock fraud initiatives was somewhat odd, since the Commis-
sion's efforts to curb abuses associated with the regulation generally have been separate and
apart from any distinct program to stop micro-cap stock fraud. While it is conceivable that
most of the fraud involving securities offered under Regulation S has been associated in one
way or another with thinly capitalized companies, the Commission announced the amend-
ments as a means to fix an ongoing micro-cap stock fraud problem that has become a press-
ing issue recently. The amendments to Regulation S are more a product of the ongoing
abuses in the regulation which have been the subject of scrutiny by Congress and the media.
See supra Part V for a history of events leading to amendments in the regulation.
208 Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9632.
209 See id. at 9632-33.
210 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3) (1998); Amending Release,
supra note 4, at 9634-35. Equity securities of domestic reporting issuers no longer have the
benefit of the shorter 40 day restricted period, but now must be held for at least a full year
before they can be resold in the United States. Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(1) (1998). These securities also have to meet the stringent certifica-
tion, legending and other transactional requirements that were previously only applicable to
Category Three nonreporting companies. Id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B); Amending Release,
supra note 4, at 9635-36.
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the implementation of a new rule that now effectively categorizes equity
securities of domestic issuers, reporting and nonreporting, as restricted se-
curities within the meaning of Rule 144.2" Foreign issuers did not suffer
the same fate as domestic reporting issuers. In the proposed amendments
to the regulation, the Commission considered imposing Category Three re-
strictions and the restricted securities classification to foreign issuers with a
"principal market" in the United States for their securities.2" The Com-
mission decided not to impose these additional restrictions in the amend-
ments because of a lack of abuse in this area of the regulation.2"3
The amendments took various approaches to tackle some of the abuses
of Regulation S. In going through the regulation as amended, it is impor-
tant to focus on what relevant changes, if any, were made to the regulation
from its originally adopted form.
A. General Statement Not Affected by Amendments
There were no changes to the General Statement as it was originally
written under Rule 901.24 The General Statement continues to provide that
offers and sales of securities outside the United States meeting the re-
quirements of Regulation S are not subject to the registration requirements
under Section 5 of the Securities Act.2" 5 The General Statement can con-
tinue to be used as a basis alone for determining whether the registration
provisions of the Securities Act would apply or the provisions of the issuer
and resale safe harbors can continue to be followed to meet within the con-
fines of the General Statement. Therefore, while the wording of the Gen-
eral Statement has not been changed literally by the amendments, the
requirements needed to meet the General Statement have been somewhat
modified through amendments to the issuer and resale safe harbors.
B. Amendments to the Issuer and Resale Safe Harbors
The amendments shifted the classification of securities that fall under
the different issuer safe harbor categories. Several provisions were added
that changed or modified some of the requirements necessary for qualify-
ing under the safe harbors. The most dramatic change can be seen in the
areas of the regulation covering the securities of domestic reporting issuers.
2I See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998); Amending Release, supra
note 4, at 9636.212 See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9260-63. See also supra notes
196-99 and accompanying text.
213 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9633; Proposed Amendments Release, supra
note 152, at 9260-63. However, the Commission did warn that it would still "monitor prac-
tices in this area" and "revisit the issue" should abuses occur. Amending Release, supra
note 4, at 9633.214 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1998).
215 See id. For a more detailed analysis and definition of the General Statement, see su-
pra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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1. Amendments to the Two General Conditions of an Offshore Transac-
tion and No Directed Selling Efforts in the United States
The two general conditions that there be both an offshore transaction
and no directed selling efforts in the United States continue to apply to both
the issuer and resale safe harbors."6 However, the definitions underlying
these two conditions have undergone some minor changes from their origi-
nal form.
An offer or sale must still be made in an offshore transaction to qualify
for the issuer and resale safe harbors."7 The definition of an "offshore
transaction" has not been changed substantively in any way by the amend-
ments." 8 However, the definition of a "designated offshore securities mar-
ket" for purposes of qualifying for the offshore transaction requirement has
been amended to reflect and include those exchanges that were later named
as designated offshore securities markets after the original regulation was
adopted.219
The requirements for the issuer and resale safe harbors still mandate
that no directed selling efforts be made in the United States by an issuer,
distributor and any of their respective affiliates or agents.220 The defini-
tions underlying the meaning of directed selling efforts have generally re-
mained the same but have been modified within the regulation itself to
make them more concise." Directed selling efforts are still those activities
2"6 Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(a)(1)-(2), 230.904(a)(l)-(2) (1998).
217 Id. §§ 230.903(a)(1), 230.904(a)(1).
218 Id. § 230.902(h). An offer or sale of securities is still deemed to have occurred in an
offshore transaction if the offer is not made to a person in the United States and either (1)
the buyer is outside the United States at the time the buy order is originated or the seller
(and any person acting on its behalf) reasonably believes that the buyer is outside the United
States or (2)(a) for purposes of the issuer safe harbor, the transaction is executed in, on or
through a physical trading floor of a foreign securities exchange or (b) for purposes of the
resale safe harbor, the transaction is executed in, on or through the facilities of a designated
offshore securities market. See id.
219 Id. § 230.902(b). See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation
and definition of a designated offshore securities market. The additional exchanges that
have been added to the definition of a designated offshore securities market include the Al-
berta Stock Exchange, the Bermuda Stock Exchange, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, the
European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (the European equivalent
to NASDAQ, recently included in the definition), the Helsinki Stock Exchange, the Irish
Stock Exchange, the Istanbul Stock Exchange, the Mexican Stock Exchange, the Oslo Stock
Exchange, the Stock Exchange of Singapore Ltd., and the Warsaw Stock Exchange. See
Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b) (1998). These exchanges were designated
by the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance as designated offshore securities markets
through a series of interpretive letters. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
22Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(a)(2), 230.904(a)(2).
22I d. § 230.902(c). See also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for a general
analysis of the meaning of directed selling efforts. The definition of directed selling efforts
under Rule 902(c) was amended to make it more clear and concise. See Amended Regula-
tion S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(c). The new Rule 902(c) takes the old Rule 902(b) definition of
directed selling efforts and the old Rule 902(k) definition for a "publication with a general
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that have the effect of conditioning the market in the United States for se-
curities being offered and sold in reliance on Regulation S.'
2. Amendments to the Issuer Safe Harbor
Equity securities of domestic reporting issuers were moved into the
third issuer safe harbor category while equity securities of foreign reporting
issuers with a substantial market interest in the United States retained their
Category Two status.2" The issuer safe harbor categories were also made
more concise and understandable through the amendments. 4
(a) Changes to Category One
The first issuer safe harbor category was generally unaffected by the
amendments.' It still applies to the securities of foreign issuers with "no
substantial U.S. market interest" for their securities, 6 securities offered
circulation in the United States" and combines the two to make the definition of directed
selling efforts more understandable. Id. The new Rule 902(c) also delineates in better
fashion what activities do not constitute directed selling efforts for purposes of the regula-
tion. Id. § 230.902(c)(3). Added to this list of activities which would not constitute directed
selling efforts not contained in the original section covering directed selling efforts is a pro-
vision exempting notices of certain proposed offerings under section 230.135 and certain
proposed unregistered offerings under section 230.135c. Id. § 230.902(c)(3)(vi). Also in-
cluded in this list of activities not constituting directed selling efforts is a provision govern-
ing access by journalists to offshore press conferences, meetings and/or written press
materials in which a present or proposed offering of securities is discussed and the require-
ments of section 230.135e are satisfied. Id. § 230.902(c)(3)(vii). In October 1997, the
Commission adopted Rule 135e of the Securities Act which provided a safe harbor for off-
shore press activities conducted in connection with an offering by a foreign private issuer or
a foreign government issuer. See Offshore Press Conferences, Meetings with Company
Representatives Conducted Offshore and Press-Related Materials Released Offshore, 17
C.F.R. § 230.135e, Securities Act Release No. 33-7470, 62 Fed. Reg. 53948 (Oct. 17,
1997). Activities meeting the requirements of this safe harbor would not, among other
things, constitute directed selling efforts within the meaning of Regulation S. Id. at 53950.
The old Rule 902(b) definition of directed selling efforts was amended to reflect this new
safe harbor and the substance of these amendments are now contained in the current defini-
tion under Rule 902(c). See id.; Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(c)(3)(vii)
(1998).
See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(c) (1998).
See id. at § 230.903(b)(2)-(3).
24 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9638. The captions for the three issuer safe
harbor categories have now been labeled "Category I ," "Category 2" and "Category 3." Id.;
Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(l)-(3). Some of the definitions in the Rule
902 definitional section of the regulation were also literally moved into the Rule 903 issuer
safe harbor categories to make these categories more understandable. See Amending Re-
lease, supra note 4, at 9638.
11 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(1) (1998).
226 Id. § 230.903(b)(1)(i). The definition of "substantial U.S. market interest" has re-
mained relatively the same as the old Rule 902(n) and is now defined in Rule 9020). See id.
§ 230.902(j). For a discussion of the definition of "substantial U.S. market interest," see
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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and sold in "overseas directed offerings," 7 securities backed by the full
faith and credit of a foreign government, 8 and securities offered and sold
pursuant to certain employee benefit plans established and administered in
accordance with the laws of a foreign country. 9 Offers and sales of secu-
rities under this category only have to meet the two general conditions of
an offshore transaction and no directed selling efforts in the United
States." °
While the definitional and categorical aspects of Category One have
not been changed by the amendments, a particular class of securities cov-
ered under this category has been affected. Category One equity securities
of domestic issuers sold to foreign resident employees pursuant to em-
ployee benefit plans governed by foreign law are now classified as re-
stricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144." Therefore, they are
subject to the restrictions associated with being classified as restricted se-
curities, including a one year holding period before the securities can be re-
sold into the United States. 2 Prior to the amendments these type of
securities were not subject to any kind of restrictions or limitations other
than those specified under Category One. 3
1, Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(1)(ii) (1998). The definition of an
"overseas directed offering" has basically remained the same as the definition in the old
Rule 9020). For discussion of the definition of "overseas directed offering" see supra note
55 and accompanying text. The definition formerly under Rule 902G) of what constitutes an
"overseas directed offering" is now contained within the section governing Category One
for clarity purposes. Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(I)(ii) (1998).
8 See id. § 230.903(b)(1)(iii).
-9 See id. § 230.903(b)(1)(iv). For a discussion of when securities offered to employees
pursuant to an "employee benefit plan" established and administered in accordance with the
laws of a foreign country will fall under the first issuer safe harbor category, see supra note
57 and accompanying text.
230 See id. § 230.903(b)(1).
"' See id. § 230.905; Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9634. Regulation S now con-
tains a new Rule 905 which in effect treats equity securities of domestic issuers as restricted
securities within the meaning of Rule 144. See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.905; Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1997). All securities under this restricted securi-
ties status are subject to, among other things, a one year holding period. See § 230.144. See
also infra notes 278-93 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion and analysis of
Rule 905.
22 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998); Amending Release, supra
note 4, at 9634. The Commission noted that several commentors to the Commission's pro-
posed amendments to Regulation S felt that it was inappropriate to require foreign resident
employees to accept restricted securities pursuant to their employee benefit plans. See id.
However, since Rule 905 was to extend to all equity securities of domestic issuers, it deter-
mined to apply Rule 905 to these types of securities. See id. The Commission advised that
if reporting domestic issuers wished to give their foreign resident employees "immediate ac-
cess" to the U.S. markets to sell such securities, that the Form S-8 is an available method to
permit such issuers to register these types of securities on a streamlined basis. See id.
11 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(1)(iv) (1990). See also Amending
Release, supra note 4, at 9634.
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(b) Changes to Category Two
There has been a transition in the type of securities covered under
Category Two.2 4 Securities covered under this category now include the
securities of foreign reporting issuers with a substantial market interest in
the United States for their securities, debt securities of reporting issuers,
and debt securities of nonreporting foreign issuers.2 Category Two no
longer covers equity securities of domestic reporting issuers which are now
covered under the third issuer safe harbor category. 6 This class of securi-
ties was the hardest hit by the amendments and, in the end, may have be-
come a casualty of the regulation's abuses.
While there has been a shift in the class of securities covered under
Category Two, the requirements under this category have generally re-
mained the same with a few minor exceptions. Securities covered under
Category Two are still required to meet the two general conditions of an
offshore transaction and no directed selling efforts in the United States. 7
They must also continue to meet a set of transactional and offering restric-
tions."8
The transactional restrictions under Category Two have remained the
same, except for a change in terminology; this change should not, however,
produce any confusion. Securities covered under Category Two continue
to be subject to a 40 day restricted period wherein the securities cannot be
offered or sold to or for the benefit of a U.S. person. 9 Distributors selling
securities to certain securities professionals during this restricted period
must continue to send confirmation or other notice to the purchaser stating
that the purchaser is subject to the same restrictions on offers and sales that
applied to the selling distributor.24 The term "restricted period" as used in
the transactional requirements, and in the original regulation in general to
describe the holding period applicable to the Regulation S safe harbors, has
now been changed to the term "distribution compliance period." 4 "Distri-
bution compliance period" does not mean anything different from the pre-
23
4 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(2) (1998).
2
11 See id.
23 See id. § 230.903(b)(2)-(3). See also Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.903(c)(2) (1990). Thus domestic reporting issuers no longer enjoy the benefits of a
shorter, 40 day holding period and the less stringent transactional restrictions that are associ-
ated with securities covered under Category Two. See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.903(b)(2)(ii)-(iii).
2 7 See id. § 230.903(a).
236 See id. § 230.903(b)(2).
See id. § 230.903(b)(2)(ii).
2' See id. § 230.903(b)(2)(iii).
241 See id. The new definition of "distribution compliance period" is substantially the
same as the definition of "restricted period" in the original Regulation S. See Amended
Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(f) (1998) (defining "distribution compliance period");
Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(m) (1990) (defining "restricted period"). See
also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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viously used "restricted period," but was simply a means to distinguish
"distribution compliance period" from the term "restricted securities" now
applicable to domestic equity securities offered under Regulation S.242
As applied to securities covered under Category Two, the offering re-
strictions governing these securities have not changed.243 Distributors must
still agree in writing that all offers and sales made prior to the end of a dis-
tribution compliance period be conducted in compliance with the rules
governing Regulation S.2" All offering materials used in connection with
the sale of Regulation S securities during the distribution compliance pe-
riod must also continue to include statements that the securities have not
been registered and may not be sold in the United States or to U.S. persons
absent registration or an exemption.245
(c) Changes to Category Three
Category Three continues to be the third residual safe harbor category
and applies to all equity and debt securities not covered under Categories
One and Two.246 Category Three now includes the equity securities of do-
mestic reporting issuers, domestic nonreporting issuers and foreign nonre-
porting issuers with a substantial market interest in the United States for
their securities.24 7
The procedures for Category Three continue to be the most rigorous in
the issuer safe harbor categories because of the greater likelihood of these
securities flowing back into the United States.24 Securities under this
242 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9635. New Rule 905 now categorizes equity
securities of domestic issuers as restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144. See
Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998). See also infra notes 281-84 and ac-
companying text. The Commission changed the term restricted period to distribution com-
pliance period to avoid confusion between the requirements applicable under the issuer safe
harbors from those applicable under Rule 144. See Amending Release, supra note 4, at
9635. The Commission felt that changing the holding period under Regulation S to the term
"distribution compliance period" would clarify that the availability of the issuer safe harbor
has "no bearing on whether purchasers of Regulation S securities may be acting as statutory
underwriters if they purchase with a view to reselling into the U.S. markets." See id.
2413 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(g), 230.903(b)(2)(i) (1998). But
see infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text (discussing how the offering restrictions have
changed as applied to Category Three securities of domestic issuers to address prohibitions
on hedging.)2 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(g)(1) (1998).
24s See id. § 230.902(g)(2). Such statements are required to appear on the cover or inside
page of a prospectus or offering circular used in connection with the sale. See id. §
230.902(g)(2)(i). They must also appear in the underwriting section of any prospectus or
offering circular in connection with the sale. See id. § 230.902(g)(2)(ii). They must further
appear in any advertisement made or issued by an issuer, distributor or any of their respec-
tive affiliates or agents. See id. § 230.902(g)(2)(iii).
246 See id. § 230.903(b)(3).
247 See id.
248 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9635.
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category must continue to meet the two general conditions of an offshore
transaction and no directed selling efforts in the United States.249 They are
also required to meet a stringent set of transactional and offering restric-
tions that have been modified from their original form."5
The transactional restrictions under Category Three are divided be-
tween debt and equity securities.2"' The transactional restrictions for debt
securities are less stringent than those for equity securities and have not
changed from the original regulation.252 Debt securities continue to be
governed by a 40 day distribution compliance period. 3 They also have to
be represented upon issuance by a "temporary global security which is not
exchangeable for definitive securities" until expiration of this 40 day pe-
riod and, for persons other than distributors, until "certification of benefi-
cial ownership of the securities by a non-U.S. person" or of a U.S. person
who purchased the securities in a transaction exempt from registration. 4
The transactional requirements as applied to Category Three equity
securities continue to be the most comprehensive in the regulation.25
Category Three equity securities are still subject to a one year restricted or
distribution compliance period. 6 Within this distribution compliance pe-
riod, purchasers, other than distributors, must certify that they are not U.S.
persons and are not acquiring the securities for the account or benefit of a
U.S. person. 7 Purchasers must also continue to agree to resell these secu-
rities only in accordance with the rules under Regulation S, registration or
under any other exemption."s However, under this purchasing agreement
restriction, the amendments have added a new requirement that all pur-
chasers agree additionally not to engage in hedging transactions with re-
spect to these securities "unless in compliance with the Act.
2 59
Other Category Three transactional restrictions require that a legend
be placed on the securities of Category Three domestic issuers stating that
transfers in these securities are prohibited except in accordance with the
provisions governing the regulation.26 With the amendments this legend
must now also contain a provision within it stating that hedging in these se-
249 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a) (1998).
25o See id. §§ 230.902(g), 230.903(b)(3).
25 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(ii)-(iii).
2 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(ii). See also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
" See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(ii)(A).
254 Id. § 230.903(b)(3)(ii)(B).
2" See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)-(iv).
256 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(A). The transactional restrictions must be followed if an
offer or sale of the securities offered under Regulation S is to take place prior to the end of
the one year distribution compliance period. See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B).
2 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(1).
2' See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2).
2s9 Id.
21 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(3).
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curities may not be conducted "unless in compliance with the Act. ' 26 The
issuer, either by contract, provision in its bylaws or other comparable
document, must also be bound to refuse to register any transfer of securities
not made in compliance with the rules governing Regulation S.262 Dis-
tributors selling Category Three equity or debt securities prior to the expi-
ration of the distribution compliance period must continue to provide
notice to these purchasers that each purchaser is subject to the same re-
strictions as those that applied to the selling distributor.
263
The amendments basically changed the transactional restrictions in the
third issuer safe harbor category to require that purchasing agreements and
legends contained on the securities now include statements prohibiting
hedging activities within the distribution compliance period unless in com-
pliance with the Act.'" These changes seem to evince the Commission's
way of ensuring that those acquiring Category Three securities are put on
notice that some forms of hedging in these securities are forbidden. They
also seem to show the Commission's position against hedging as noted in
the GFL Ultra Fund case, and may be an attempt by the Commission to
address any concerns of the public's lack of awareness of such prohibitions
that were the subject of former Commissioner Wallman's dissent in that
case.
265
There were amendments to the offering restrictions applicable to do-
mestic equity securities under Category Three which, like the amendments
to the transactional restrictions, concerned prohibitions on hedging.2' 6 Un-
der the first offering restriction for equity securities covered under Cate-
gory Three, distributors are still required to agree in writing that all offers
and sales made prior to the expiration of the distribution compliance period
be made in compliance with the regulation.267 Distributors are now also re-
quired, with respect to equity securities of domestic issuers, to agree in
writing not to engage in hedging transactions with these securities prior to
the expiration of the distribution compliance period "unless in compliance
with the Act., 268 The second offering restriction continues to require that
261 Id.
262 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(4).
263 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iv).
264 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3).
265See GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1961-63. See also supra notes 153-55 and ac-
companying text. It is important to note that, given the uncertainty of the GFL Ultra Fund
case and the Commission's conflicting statements regarding hedging in Regulation S, the
public will probably still be unaware of what prohibitions exist against hedging. See infra
notes 340-54 and accompanying text.
266 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(g), 230.903(b)(3)(i) (1998). For
debt securities covered under Category Three, the offering restrictions are essentially the
same as those that govern Category Two, including the applicability of a 40 day distribution
compliance period. See id. See also supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.267 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(g)(1)(i) (1998).
268 Id. § 230.902(g)(1)(ii).
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all offering materials and documents used in connection with the offer and
sale of Category Three securities contain statements that the securities have
not been registered and may not be offered or sold in the United States or
to U.S. persons.269 The amendments now likewise require, with respect to
equity securities of domestic issuers, that these offering materials state that
hedging transactions in these securities are prohibited "unless in compli-
ance with the Act."27 The two changes in the offering restrictions as ap-
plied to the equity securities of domestic issuers reflect the Commission's
intention on providing notice to anyone involved in these type of securities
that certain kinds of hedging activities are not allowed under the regula-
tion.271
(d) Changes to the Resale Safe Harbor and New Rule 905
There were no literal changes to the resale safe harbor. However, a
newly adopted Rule 905 effectively changed the scope of how the resale
safe harbor is to be applied within the regulation. 272 Domestic equity secu-
rities offered under Regulation S are also now classified as restricted secu-
rities within the meaning of Rule 144.273
(i) Changes to the Resale Safe Harbor
The resale safe harbor has changed very little in substance.27 Rule
904 continues to provide a safe harbor for the offshore resale of unregis-
tered securities by any persons other than the issuer, distributor, or any of
their respective affiliates or agents. 275 To be eligible for the resale safe
harbor, the two general conditions of an offshore transaction and no di-
rected selling efforts in the United States have to be met as well as several
additional conditions pertaining to dealers and certain affiliates, as applica-
ble.276 While the resale safe harbor has substantively remained the same,
269 See id. § 230.902(g)(2).
270 Id. These statements must appear in the same areas within the materials as required
under Category Two. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
271 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(g)(1)(ii), 230.902(g)(2). It is im-
portant to note that the new amended anti-hedging provisions in the Category Three trans-
actional and offering restrictions reflect that hedging activities involving these securities are
not to take place "unless in compliance with the Act." Id. §§ 230.902(g)(1)(ii),
230.902(g)(2), 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3). It can be presumed that any hedging activities
associated with such securities which occur within the one year distribution compliance pe-
riod could be deemed not to be "in compliance with the Act" in light of the GFL Ultra Fund
case. See id. See also supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text.21 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.904, 230.905 (1998).
273 See id. § 230.905.
274 See id. § 230.904.
27s See id. § 230.904(a).
276 See id. § 230.904(a)(1)-(3). Securities professionals are subject to two additional
conditions to qualify for the resale safe harbor. See id. § 230.904(b)(1). Prior to the end of
a relevant distribution compliance period, dealers or any persons receiving selling conces-
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the rules governing the effect of resales of domestic securities under this
safe harbor have been modified by Rule 905.277
(ii) New Rule 905
The Commission added new Rule 905 to Regulation S and entitled it
"Resale Limitations." 278 This rule now provides a restricted securities clas-
sification to domestic equity securities and prohibits the use of the resale
safe harbor as a means to wash off restrictions from such restricted securi-
ties.279 Indirectly through Rule 144, Rule 905 also attempts to remedy the
problems associated with the misuse of promissory notes in the regula-
tion.
280
(a) Domestic Equity Securities now Classified as Restricted Securities
Within the Meaning of Rule 144
The Commission amended Regulation S and added Rule 905 to "clar-
ify the legal obligations of purchasers" in securities offered under Regula-
tion S.211 In doing so, the Commission promulgated Rule 905 and
simultaneously amended Rule 144 to classify domestic equity securities of
both reporting and nonreporting issuers as restricted securities.8 2 Rule 905
sions for the securities sold must not know that the buyer of such securities is a U.S. person.
See id. § 230.904(b)(1)(i). If such a dealer or other person receiving selling concessions
with respect to the securities sold knows that the purchaser is likewise a dealer or a person
receiving a selling concession in connection with the offer or sale, the dealer acting on the
seller's behalf must send to the purchaser notice that the securities may be sold during the
distribution compliance period only in accordance with the rules governing Regulation S.
See id. § 230.904(b)(I)(ii). An officer or director of an issuer or distributor is eligible to
rely on the resale safe harbor if the sole reason such officer or director may be deemed an
affiliate is by virtue of position and no special compensation is paid in connection with the
offer and sale by such officer or director. See id. § 230.904(b)(2).




281 Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9636. New Rule 905, entitled "Resale Limita-
tions," states:
Equity securities of domestic issuers acquired from the issuer, a distributor, or any of
their respective affiliates in a transaction subject to the conditions of § 230.901 or §
230.903 are deemed to be "restricted securities' as defined in § 230.144. Resales of any
such restricted securities by the offshore purchaser must be made in accordance with this
Regulation S (§ 230.901 through § 230.905, and Preliminary Notes), the registration re-
quirements of the Act or an exemption therefrom. Any "restricted securities," as defined
in § 230.144, that are equity securities of a domestic issuer will continue to be deemed to
be restricted securities, notwithstanding that they were acquired in a resale transaction
made pursuant to § 230.901 or § 230.904.
Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998).
282 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9636, and Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.905. See also Rule 144, 17 C.F.R § 230.144(a)(3)(v) (1997). Rule 144(a)(3), which
defines the term "restricted securities," now has a section that includes "[e]quity securities of
domestic issuers acquired in a transaction or chain of transactions subject to the conditions"
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of Regulation S specifically provides that equity securities of domestic is-
suers acquired in an offer or sale subject to Regulation S will be deemed
restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144." This new restricted
securities classification means that equity securities of domestic issuers are
now subject to the requirements of Rule 144, including a one year holding
period before they can be resold.284
(b) Resales of Domestic Equity Securities not Eliminating the Re-
stricted Securities Classification
Rule 905 now prevents investors from using the resale safe harbor as a
means to wash off restrictions from restricted securities offered under
Regulation S and falling within the definition of Rule 144 generally.
285
Rule 905 specifically provides that restricted securities as defined under
Rule 144 "will continue to be deemed" restricted securities "notwithstand-
ing that they were acquired in a resale transaction" pursuant to the resale
safe harbor. 86 These new provisions are a major step beyond the cautionary
statements made by the Commission prior to the amendments being
adopted.28 7
(c) The Effect of Rule 905 on Promissory Notes
By deeming domestic equity securities as restricted securities within
the meaning of Rule 144, the Commission prohibited the use of promissory
notes in the purchase of Regulation S securities where the expectation of
repayment for the promissory notes stemmed from the resale of Regulation
of the General Statement or issuer safe harbor categories under Regulation S. Rule 144, §
230.144(a)(3)(v). In this regard, Rule 905 appears to have added Rule 144 as an available
resale exemption for securities offered under Regulation S. See Amended Regulation S, 17
C.F.R. § 230.905.
283 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905.
284 See Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (1997). While this one year holding period
might seem irrelevant because a one year distribution compliance period already exists for
Category Three domestic equity securities, the requirement serves as an additional measure
to ensure that these securities will not be resold to any persons in the United States for at
least a year and is relevant in tolling the holding period for purchases in Regulation S
through the use of promissory notes. See id.
28s Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998).
286 Id. In the adopting release accompanying the amendments the Commission noted that
"Rule 905 clarifies that the resale of restricted securities offshore under Rule 904 does not
wash off the restricted status of those securities to allow them to be freely resold into the
United States by the purchaser." Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9637.
287 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998); Problematic Practices Re-
lease, supra note 96, at 35,664; In Touch Global LLC (Nov. 14, 1995), supra note 137 at
77,038-39. See also supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cau-
tionary statements made by the Commission regarding the resale safe harbor being used to
wash off restrictions.
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S securities back into the United States.288 Now that Rule 144 is applied to
domestic equity securities, when purchasing Regulation S securities
through the use of promissory notes, the one year holding period under
Rule 144 is tolled until certain conditions are satisfied.289 The one year
holding period will not begin to run for purchasers unless the promissory
note (1) "provides full recourse against the purchaser of the securities;" and
(2) "is secured by collateral, other than the securities purchased, having a
fair market value at least equal to the purchase price of the securities pur-
chased."29 Furthermore, after the holding period requirement has been
satisfied, the promissory note must be paid in full before there can be a re-
sale of the securities under Rule 144.29 The Commission noted that this
provision "ensures that the funds obtained through the Rule 144 resales
will not be used to pay off the promissory note."292 Therefore, foreign pur-
chasers can no longer purchase securities under Regulation S with promis-
sory notes and then later directly pay off such promissory notes with
proceeds from reselling the Regulation S securities back into the United
States.2 93
C. Other Changes Through the Amendments
The amendments imposed a quarterly reporting requirement on Regu-
lation S offerings by domestic issuers.2 94 They also addressed recent con-
cems about abuses in the area of-convertible securities. 295
2I See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998). See also supra notes 124-34
and accompanying text.29 See Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(2) (1997).
290 Id. § 230.144(d)(2)(i)(ii).
291 See id. § 230.144(d)(2)(iii); Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9637.
292 Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9637. It is important to note that in the proposals
to amend Regulation S, the Commission proposed to prohibit the use of promissory notes
altogether as a form of payment for Regulation S securities. See Proposed Amendments
Release, supra note 152, at 9262-63; Amending Release, at 9637. However, the Commis-
sion felt that the tolling approach under Rule 144 would address the promissory note prob-
lem since securities purchased under Regulation S would be fully paid before the securities
could be resold in the United States under Rule 144. See Amending Release, at 9637. The
Commission noted that in this case "the resale of the securities in the U.S. markets under
Rule 144 would not be used to raise funds to repay the promissory note." See Amending
Release, at 9637. The Commission also explained that under the approach adopted, promis-
sory notes can still be accepted as payment for the purchase of Regulation S equity securities
by domestic companies. See Amending Release, at 9637.
293 But see infra notes 370-71 for a discussion on how a lender could still be used as a
middleman to indirectly pay off promissory notes with proceeds from the resale of Regula-
tion S securities back into the United States.
294 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9638.
295 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9634. See also Jaye Scholl, Pirates' Play?,
BARRON'S, Jan. 7, 1997, at 17.
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1. Reporting ofRegulation S Transactions
The change in the distribution compliance period from 40 days to one
year for domestic issuers lessened the need for such issuers to report the
sale of Regulation S securities within fifteen days of an offering.296 There-
fore, the amendments eliminated the fifteen day Form 8-K reporting re-
quirement and substituted a quarterly reporting requirement. 9 7 This new
quarterly reporting requirement will be effective January 1, 1999, and the
Form 8-K requirement should be followed until then."8
2. Convertible Securities
The amendments addressed a troubling area involving Regulation S
and convertible securities.2 99 Typically with convertible securities, inves-
tors will buy convertible bonds expecting to receive interest payments
while waiting for the stock price to increase." ° These investors will then
usually convert their convertible bonds after the stock price has risen above
an agreed-upon conversion price.3 A type of Regulation S convertible
debenture which works very differently than the ordinary convertible bond
has resulted in problems under the regulation. This type of convertible de-
benture has a conversion price that is typically set by taking the average
price of the stock over five days leading up to the conversion date.30 2 In
addition, the issuer will include an extra discount from the final conversion
price.3"3 With this type of convertible debenture, the lower the price of the
stock, the better the deal for the convertible debenture investor."'
296 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. Arguably, the market still needs to
know almost immediately about any substantial offerings under the regulation because news
of such an offering can sometimes have an adverse effect on the issuer's stock price. See
supra note 178 and accompanying text.
297 Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9638. The Commission did not see it necessary
to mandate that domestic issuers report their Regulation S offerings within 15 days of occur-
rence in light of the fact that these securities cannot be sold back in the United States for at
least one year. See id.
29 See id. Forms I0-Q, 1O-QSB, 10K or 1OKSB can be used, as applicable, to fulfill this
quarterly reporting requirement. See id. The Commission delayed the effectiveness of the
new quarterly reporting requirements so that it could "monitor closely developments under
the amended safe harbor procedures during a transition period." Id. The exception to this
delayed effectiveness rule is that, to the extent that the sales qualify for Category One treat-
ment under the issuer safe harbor categories, a domestic issuer's sale of Regulation S secu-
rities to its non-U.S. resident employees pursuant to an employee benefit plan only has to be
reported by the issuer on an aggregated basis with Form I0-Q, rather than with Form 8-K,
prior to January 1, 1999. See id.
29See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9634.
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For some companies engaging in transactions with this type of Regu-
lation S convertible debenture, share prices had a "mysterious habit of dip-
ping" just before the debentures were converted. °5 The decrease in share
price gave offshore debenture holders great bargains when converting their
convertible debentures and led to increased suspicions about the use of
Regulation S convertible debentures in the marketplace.3" As a result,
several companies have suspended or refused to honor conversion rights on
these type of convertible securities.30 7 Some companies have claimed that
investors were part of an effort to drive down the share price, through short
selling or otherwise, and to convert their debentures at bargain prices.308
Other companies did not have the sufficient number of authorized shares to
issue upon conversion as a result of the ratcheting-up effect of the dis-
counted conversion price.309
These problems led the Commission to address directly the use of
convertible securities under Regulation S in the amendments. 30  In ad-
dressing the convertible securities problem, the Commission stated that the
new restrictions and the restricted securities classification applicable to
domestic equity securities would also apply to convertible securities.31
The Commission reasoned that convertible securities, including convertible
debt securities, met the definition of "equity securities" and therefore
would be subject to the new restrictions. 31 '2 The Commission further noted
305 See id.
1o See id. An example of this can be seen in the company of Chantal Pharmaceutical.
See id. On October 30, 1996, this company raised $5.2 million in a Regulation S converti-
ble deal. See id. The terms called for conversion of one third of the debentures into com-
mon stock shares 45 days later, on December 14. See id. The price set in October was to be
the lesser of $3.91 a share or 80% of the average closing price five days immediately pre-
ceding the conversion date. See id. "Chantal's stock sank to new lows in the days leading
up to the conversion, averaging 1 7/8 a share between December 9 and 13." Id. With the
20% discount, the December conversion appears to have resulted in an additional 1.1 mil-
lion shares outstanding. See id.
307 See id. See also Richard H. Rowe, An Overview of Certain Registration Provisions,
Exemptions and Developments Under the U.S. Securities Law Governing Capital Forma-
tion, 1035 PLI/Corp 89, 158 (1998).
308 See Scholl, supra note 295. One issuer even stated that it intended to honor conver-
sions only for those investors whose trading records proved that they were not part of an or-
ganized effort to drive down the issuer's stock price in the days before the conversion. See
id.
9 See Rowe, supra note 307, at 158; Scholl, supra note 295. Under the terms of these
deals, the number of shares obtained at conversion increases as share prices decline. See
Weiss, supra note 178, at 118.
30 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9634.
311 See id.
312 Id. The Commission reasoned that Rule 405 of Regulation C defines the term equity
security to include securities convertible or exchangeable into stock. See id. See also Rule
405 Definitions of terms, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1997).
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that abuses involving the use of convertible securities made it necessary to
apply the new restrictions to this type of securities.313
VII. PROBABLE IMPACT OF AMENDMENTS ON REGULATION S
The amendments were designed specifically to address abusive prac-
tices occurring under the regulation.314 The amendments, intentionally or
unintentionally, also addressed some of the marketplace concerns with the
regulation. Whether or not the amendments will effectively control or
eliminate these problems, only time will tell. While no one can predict the
future, a close reading of the amendments in light of ongoing abuses of the
regulation might provide some guidance as to how the amendments will
impact present regulatory and marketplace concerns.
A. Probable Effect of the Amendments on the Cost of Raising Capital
under Regulation S
The amendments will probably raise the cost that domestic reporting
issuers will have to incur in raising capital under Regulation S. These new
costs will accrue as a direct consequence of the new legending, certifica-
tion, record keeping and overall monitoring burdens that domestic report-
ing issuers will now have to face."'
The extension of the holding period for equity securities of domestic
reporting issuers will also affect the price at which these securities will be
offered by domestic issuers. The extension of the holding period to one
year will probably necessitate domestic reporting issuers offering greater
discounts on their securities than they did before the amendments.3"' These
discounts will be even more warranted given that these securities will be
labeled restricted securities and contain legends stating that the transfer of
"I See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9634. The Commission cited Jaye Scholl's
article, see supra note 295, as a reference for abuses in the use of convertible securities un-
der Regulation S. See id.
314 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9632.
3 5 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3) (1998). Even the Commission
has conceded that the new restrictions may make it more costly for domestic issuers to raise
capital through Regulation S. See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9639. However, the
Commission has categorized this potential increase in costs as "negligible." Id. Commis-
sion staff conducted an informal survey of attorneys in private practice whose clients could
be expected to rely on Regulation S. See id. From the survey, the Commission found that
domestic issuers selling equity securities under the regulation already complied with the
Category Three certification and legending requirements "as a matter of common practice."
See id. Therefore based on the survey the Commission felt that "[n]o new costs will be im-
posed on domestic issuers as a result of formally extending the Category Three requirements
to sales of equity securities by domestic issuers." Id.
316 See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 37; Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96,
at 35664. The larger discount will reflect the longer period offshore purchasers will have to
hold onto their securities before reselling them in the United States and thus the inherent
risks associated with waiting out the holding period. See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 37.
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these securities is prohibited.317 These greater discounts will in turn force
domestic reporting issuers to sell higher quantities of securities to raise the
same amount of capital that they were able to raise prior to the amend-
ments. If such issuers are set on selling a fixed number of shares, then the
greater discounts will lead these issuers to raise less capital than they were
able to raise prior to the amendments.
Taking into account the higher cost of conducting a Regulation S of-
fering along with the probable decrease in the amount of capital that can be
raised, the amendments may deter domestic reporting issuers from raising
capital under Regulation S. Such issuers may be inclined to simply register
their securities or pursue other exemptions from registration rather than in-
cur the costs and inherent burdens associated with raising capital under the
regulation.3 18
The amendments should have little or no economic impact on domes-
tic nonreporting issuers and foreign issuers. Domestic nonreporting issuers
have always been subject to the Category Three requirements and therefore
the amendments should not create any additional costs for these issuers.319
Foreign issuers escaped the brunt of the amendments and therefore should
also not have to face any additional costs as a result of the amendments.
"' See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(iii)(B)(3), 230.905 (1998).
318 In the release accompanying the amendments, the Commission advised that "domestic
reporting companies that find it too cumbersome to take advantage of the Regulation S safe
harbor" when conducting an offering could "simply register under the Securities Act or re-
sort to other exempt offerings." See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9636. It is impor-
tant to note that the probable higher costs imposed on domestic reporting issuers appeared to
contradict the intent of the Commission when it first adopted Regulation S in 1990 and
made the cost of raising capital overseas less expensive and more accessible to domestic
corporations. See supra pp. 58-59, 61 and notes 3 and 19.
319 See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(3) (1990). The securities of do-
mestic nonreporting issuers are subject to the new anti-hedging provisions. See Amended
Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(g), 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3) (1998). However, the
only additional costs on issuers associated with these provisions are the costs for adding an
additional sentence with respect to hedging on the issuer's legend, offering materials and
purchasing agreements. See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(g),
230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3) (1998). A survey of private practitioners conducted by Com-
mission staff found these increased costs with respect to hedging to be insignificant. See
Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9639. However, domestic nonreporting issuers may
have to offer greater discounts to compete with domestic reporting issuers in the future. The
securities of domestic reporting and nonreporting issuers are now subject to the same re-
strictions; but the securities of reporting issuers can more easily be resold in the market-
place. Therefore, domestic nonreporting issuers may have to offer greater discounts to
entice buyers who might otherwise be more inclined to purchase the same securities from
domestic reporting issuers. In this capacity, the amendments may have an indirect economic
impact on domestic nonreporting issuers. See infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
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B. Probable Impact of Amendments on Regulatory Abuses
The amendments to Regulation S were specifically enacted to address
the regulatory problems associated with the regulation.32 Whether or not
the amendments effectively closed the loopholes that enabled abuses to oc-
cur remains to be seen.
The abuses associated with the use of promissory notes and the resale
safe harbor to wash off restrictions from otherwise restricted securities ap-
pears to have been addressed by the amendments. The Commission used a
formula that essentially mixes rules underlying Regulation S with those
governing Rule 144. The amendments also seem to indicate that hedging is
prohibited through changes made to the offering and transactional require-
ments as applied to domestic issuers, yet nothing in the amendments or the
regulation itself seem to define this prohibition on hedging. The abuses in-
volving illegal resales within the distribution compliance period and the
use of phony offshore shell companies have always been in direct violation
of the regulation as it was written literally, therefore the amendments will
probably do no more than just make it more difficult for these abuses to
occur. Regardless of the changes brought about by the amendments and
the Commission's attempts to curb abuses in the regulation, intentional
abusers that knowingly violate the regulation will most likely continue to
abuse it. There is only so much that the Commission can do, absent en-
forcement action, to prevent these type of abusers from violating the secu-
rities laws.
A look at the amendments' probable impact on abuses of the regula-
tion should provide some guidelines for whether these abuses will continue
in the future. Some of these abuses could become more or less prevalent in
the future, not necessarily because the amendments did or did not ade-
quately address them, but because there may be more or fewer incentives
for the abuses to occur.
1. illegal Resales Within the Distribution Compliance Period
A problem that may become prevalent in the future involves the resale
of Regulation S securities by foreign purchasers during the distribution
compliance period.32 ' Larger discounts offered by issuers in light of newer
restrictions imposed by the amendments might provide a greater incentive
for purchasers to resell their securities as soon as possible. Purchasers
might want to capitalize on the immediate reward of gains from selling
their discounted securities at prevailing market prices without having to
wait out the distribution compliance period. However, the illegal resale
problem could also become less of a problem in the future as a result of
these same larger discounts being offered on Regulation S securities.
3,0 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9632-33.
32, See supra pp. 75-76 and notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
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Larger discounts may have the effect of providing comfort to purchasers
who must endure the distribution compliance period because such purchas-
ers will be less likely to incur losses when they sell their securities at the
end of the distribution compliance period. While there might be more or
less incentive for those wishing to commit this type of abuse, there are
more safeguards and devices in the regulation to prevent it from happening.
This is particularly true with respect to domestic reporting issuers for
whose securities the new transactional restrictions pertinent to these issuers
now make resale difficult for purchasers within the distribution compliance
period.322
Domestic reporting issuers need to be aware of illegal resales because
these issuers are now required to refuse to register any transfer of securities
not made in accordance with the rules governing Regulation S.3' The
Commission noted that this rule places "on issuers a monitoring role simi-
lar to that which is often imposed in connection with unregistered private
placements" and warned that, "[ijn light of the abuses in this area, domestic
reporting issuers should be held more accountable for compliance in these
offerings. Therefore, domestic reporting issuers need to be alert to
those attempting to illegally resell or wash off restrictions in the resale and
transference of securities. This new monitoring role on the part of domes-
tic reporting issuers will make it harder for such illegal resales to occur.32s
2. Creation and Use of Phony Offshore Shell Entities
The amendments will probably not have an immediate impact on the
fraudulent use of phony offshore shell entities as a means for issuers to
purchase and sell unregistered Regulation S securities in the United
States.326 However, the extension of the distribution compliance period to a
full year will most likely lessen the incentives for these abuses to occur in
the future.
322 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)-(iv) (1998).
31 See id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(4).
324 Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9636.
325 See id.
326 See supra Part IV.A.2 and notes 105-23 and accompanying text. The prohibition
against the use of phony offshore shell companies for the purchase of securities under
Regulation S has already been stated clearly in the regulation. Accordingly, there was not
much that the Commission could have done against these abuses absent aggressive enforce-
ment action. See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(k)(1)(viii) (1998). The
regulation itself specifically outlaws the creation and use of phony shell companies by cate-
gorizing corporations formed overseas by U.S. persons for the purpose of investing in un-
registered securities as U.S. persons, thereby prohibiting them from purchasing securities
under Regulation S. See id. These schemes are generally orchestrated and planned out and,
as the Sung case illustrated, can have criminal implications attached to them along with SEC
enforcement liability. See Sung, 61 SEC Docket at 2275. See also supra Part IV.A.2 and
notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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Under the regulation, purchasers of Category Three securities are re-
quired to certify that they are not U.S. persons and are not acquiring the se-
curities for the account or benefit of a U.S. person.327 The Commission felt
that the expansion of this certification requirement in the amendments to
include equity securities of domestic reporting issuers would prevent some
of the abuses involving the use of phony offshore shell entities.32" How-
ever, the expansion of this certification requirement will probably only
serve as additional notice to those already considering the perpetration of
such fraud, reinforcing the fact that a use of these entities is a violation of
the law. 329
While the certification and other transactional restrictions under Cate-
gory Three will probably not in themselves deter abuses involving phony
offshore shell entities, the extension of the distribution compliance period
to a full year probably will. Those wishing to park securities in phony off-
shore shell entities most likely wish to see an immediate to near-term gain.
Therefore, they will not want to be involved in an offshore parking scheme
that has to go on for a full year as opposed to only 40 days because many
things can happen in a year. The SEC might find them, companies could
go bankrupt, or the market might just collapse. An extension to a full year
is even more of a problem in that these schemes are often associated with
false filings and other forms of manipulation to drive a stock's share price
up to an inflated level before the shares are dumped back into the United
States.3" These "pump and dump" schemes, utilizing phony offshore shell
entities, are very difficult to execute and maintain for a full year. A year
provides more time for the market to realize that a stock is grossly overval-
ued; and when it does, the market and the short-sellers in it will expose the
stock for what it is truly worth. A full year also allows more time for the
SEC to spot an illegal manipulation in the works.
327 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9636; Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(1) (1998). This certification requirement was required for securities
covered under the original Category Three. See Original Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §
230.903(c)(3)(iii)(B)(1) (1990). With the amendments, however, this requirement now also
applies to equity securities of domestic reporting issuers. See Amended Regulation S, 17
C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(1) (1998).328 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9636.
329 Those that have been involved in these types of schemes probably already knew that
these schemes were against the law anyway and therefore any additional notice will proba-
bly just be fruitless. See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(k)(1)(viii) (1998).
33o See supra Part IV.A.2 and notes 108-23 and accompanying text. In Sofipoint, it was
alleged that proceeds from the sale of unregistered Regulation S securities were disguised as
proceeds from corporate sales. See Softpoint, 59 SEC Docket at 426. In Sung, the SEC al-
leged that a series of manipulative activities led the stock price to go from $4.00 per share to
$12.00 per share in only three months. See Sung, 61 SEC Docket at 2275. In Osheroff it
was alleged that a series of false press releases were issued to increase the price of the stock.
See Osheroff, 66 SEC Docket at 2531.
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3. Use ofPromissory Notes
By adopting amendments that effectively toll the one year holding pe-
riod in purchases using promissory notes and provide that domestic securi-
ties offered under Regulation S cannot be resold until such promissory
notes are completely paid off, the Commission addressed the problem con-
cerning the misuse of promissory notes under the regulation.3 31 Schemes
involving promissory notes, where purchasers did not have to pay anything
for their Regulation S shares before reselling them, are specifically disal-
lowed under the regulation, as such purchasers are now required to pay
their promissory notes in full before they can resell their securities in the
United States. 32
It is good that the Commission addressed what it considered to be the
improper use of promissory notes in the amendments.333 Prior to the
Commission's Problematic Practices Release and enforcement action in the
Candie's case, it was not clear that the use of promissory notes at issue in
Candie's was necessarily prohibited by the securities laws.334
4. Use of the Resale Safe Harbor to "Wash Off" Restrictions from Oth-
erwise Restricted Securities
The Commission directly addressed the problem of the resale safe
harbor being used as a means to wash off restrictions from otherwise re-
... See supra Part IV.A.3 and notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
332 See Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(2) (1997).
133 The Commission decided to take the Rule 144 approach to combat abuses concerning
promissory notes because it did not want to prohibit the use of promissory notes altogether
as payment for securities offered under Regulation S. See Amending Release, supra note 4,
at 9637. Such an approach had been considered by the Commission in its proposed amend-
ments to Regulation S. See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9262-63.
Under the new approach adopted, promissory notes can still be accepted as payment for pur-
chases of domestic equity securities under Regulation S, but under Rule 144, the resale of
securities into the U.S. markets cannot be used to raise funds to pay off such promissory
notes. See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9637.
334 See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664. See generally Candie's,
Securities Act Release No. 7263, 61 SEC Docket 758 (Feb. 21, 1996). The Problematic
Practices Release did not come out until June 27, 1995. See Problematic Practices Release,
supra note 96, at 35663. The promissory note transactions found to be violations of Regu-
lation S in the Candle's case occurred in 1993, before the Problematic Practices Release was
released. See Candie's, 61 SEC Docket at 759-61. Oddly, in the release instituting admin-
istrative proceedings and simultaneously accepting offers of settlements in the Candle's
case, the Commission cites the Problematic Practices Release as one of its basis for finding
violations of the law regarding the use of promissory notes. See id. at 761. Therefore the
Problematic Practices Release appears to have been cited on an apparently retroactive basis.
See id. It is surprising that Commissioner Wallman did not dissent in the Candie's case in
light of his dissent in the GFL Ultra Fund case against violations being found for transac-
tions not specifically delineated as being violative prior to the Problematic Practices Re-
lease. See GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1961-62.
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stricted securities in its new Rule 905.335 With the amendments, it is clear
that the resale safe harbor cannot be used to wash off the restricted securi-
ties classification pertinent to equity securities of domestic issuers.33 The
amended Regulation S now effectively outlines this rule, whereas prior to
the amendments this rule was only specifically addressed in the Commis-
sion's Problematic Practices Release and subsequent no-action letter.337
There may be strong incentives for persons to try and wash off restric-
tions from otherwise restricted securities purchased under Regulation S in
light of probable greater discounts being offered as a result of the amend-
ments.338 However, persons seeking to do so will probably have a more
difficult time given the more stringent safeguards imposed through the
Category Three transactional requirements.339
5. Hedging
The most controversial violation in the regulation involving hedging
was not clarified in the amendments.34 In the amendments, the Commis-
sion oddly placed anti-hedging provisions in the Category Three transac-
tional and offering restrictions but did not explicitly provide in the
regulation what, if any, hedging transactions are prohibited under Regula-
tion S.34' There is also no framework for when hedging transactions can
take place "in compliance with the Act" as provided for in the new anti-
hedging provisions under Category Three.342
"I See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998). See also supra Part IV.A.4
and notes 135-37 and accompanying text.336 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998).
3" See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664; In Touch Global, LLC,
supra note 137, at 77,038-39.
" Like the abuses associated with illegal resales during the distribution compliance pe-
riod, there may be strong incentives for persons to wash off restrictions from their securities
and immediately capitalize on their discounted purchases by reselling their securities at the
prevailing market price. See supra p. 111 and note 321.
3 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(iv) (1998).
34o See supra Part IV.A.5 and notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
34 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(g)(1)(ii), 230.902(g)(2),
230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3) (1998). The Commission amended Category Three to mandate
that purchasers of these securities agree "not to engage in hedging transactions with regard
to such securities unless in compliance with the Act." Id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2). The
Commission also amended Category Three to require that the legend on these securities
state, among other things, that "hedging transactions involving those securities may not be
conducted unless in compliance with the Act." Id. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(3). The offering
restrictions applicable to domestic issuers now also require that distributors agree in writing
not to engage in hedging transactions prior to the expiration of the distribution compliance
period unless in compliance with the Act. See id. § 230.902(g)(1)(ii). Offering materials
used in connection with the offering also need to state that hedging in these securities is
prohibited unless in compliance with the Act. See id. § 230.902(g)(2).
342 Id. §§ 230.902(g)(1)(ii), 230.902(g)(2), 230.903(3)(iii)(B)(2)(3).
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The Commission stated in the release accompanying the amendments
that "the amendments do not impose any new restrictions on hedging prac-
tices." '343 This statement could be taken to mean that the status quo of the
Commission's position regarding hedging underlying the GFL Ultra Fund
case continues to govern. 3" Likewise, it appears that the unanswered
questions and vague legal analysis of the GFL Ultra Fund case also con-
tinue to govern.345 The Commission did note in the release accompanying
the amendments that it was considering proposed restrictions on hedging
under Rule 144.346 These restrictions would definitely provide helpful in-
sight as to the role of hedging under Regulation S. 147
The GFL Ultra Fund case found the Fund involved in hedging to have
purchased Regulation S securities with a view towards distribution thus
making it a statutory underwriter required to register its shares before re-
selling them.348 The GFL Ultra Fund case did not state whether investors
engaged in hedging activities of fewer transactions than those of the Fund
"I See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9635 n.28.
3" See generally GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64
SEC Docket 1958 (June 18, 1997).
341 See id. at 1959-61. In light of the broad statement in the GFL Ultra Fund case that a
"trading pattern of short selling in the United States in connection with purchasing in a
Regulation S offering which essentially locks in a profit ... runs counter to the goals of
Regulation S," a lot of uncertainty still exists as to the liability an individual can incur if he
chooses to engage in short selling associated with discounted purchases under Regulation S.
See GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket at
1961. See also supra p. 83 and note 151.
346 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9635 n.28. See also Revision of Rule 144,
Rule 145 and Form 144, supra note 199, at 9252-53. The Commission sought comments on
four regulatory approaches to hedging as applied to Rule 144. See id. at 9252. The first ap-
proach was considering making the Rule 144 safe harbor unavailable for persons who hedge
during the restricted period. See id. The second approach proposed promulgating a rule that
would define certain specified hedging transactions as sales for purposes of Section 5. See
id. Therefore, such hedging transactions would need to be registered or subject to an ex-
emption. See id. The third approach proposed adopting a shorter holding period of possibly
three to six months in which hedging would not be allowed to occur without losing the Rule
144 safe harbor. See id. Thereafter, hedging could occur, but the underlying restricted secu-
rities would have to be held for the remainder of the one year holding period under Rule
144. See id. The fourth approach proposed reintroducing a tolling provision to Rule 144,
similar to a provision that was included prior to 1990, which would not specifically prohibit
hedging but would instead rely upon practitioners to apply a facts-and-circumstances test to
determine when Section 5 is implicated. See id.
341 See Revision of Rule 144, Rule 145 and Form 144, supra note 199, at 9252. How-
ever, such a remedy utilizing a formula intermixing Regulation S with Rule 144 might not
be the most coherent way of doing so. This is the same kind of formula that was used in the
abuses concerning the use of promissory notes and the resale safe harbor as a means to wash
off restrictions. See supra Part VII.B.3 and notes 331-39 and accompanying text.
141 See GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1961. See also supra pp. 82-83 and notes
145-50 and accompanying text.
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could also be held liable for violations of the securities laws.349 Now that
there are anti-hedging provisions in the Category Three offering and trans-
actional restrictions, this area of liability has become even more uncer-
tain.35 This is especially true now that purchasers of Category Three
securities are required to agree not to engage in hedging activities in these
securities "unless in compliance with the Act."35 ' In light of this new pur-
chaser agreement requirement, it is questionable whether purchasers who
would not be considered statutory underwriters under the GFL Ultra Fund
analysis could still be in violation of the regulation through the purchasing
agreement.352
Another question left open by the amendments, as applied to hedging,
relates to the new one year holding period for domestic reporting issuers.
In GFL Ultra Fund, the Fund was construed as a statutory underwriter be-
cause it had purchased Regulation S shares with a view towards distribu-
tion.353 Now that the holding period for securities of domestic reporting
issuers is one year as opposed to 40 days, it is questionable whether a pur-
chaser holding such securities for this longer period would actually be pur-
chasing these securities with a view towards distribution.3 54
Whether the amendments will actually deter hedging in Regulation S
is questionable. There is much uncertainty in this area and the amendments
have only served to add to it. If anything, this uncertainty by itself might
be the best deterrence in the regulation against hedging.
... The Fund at issue in the GFL Ultra Fund case engaged in a short selling strategy in
approximately sixty-two Regulation S deals. See GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1959.350 Now that purchasers have to agree not to engage in hedging transactions, and the leg-
end and offering materials provide that such hedging activities are not allowed "unless in
compliance with the Act," it is questionable whether purchasers not engaged in a substantial
number of hedging activities can escape liability for hedging violations simply by relying on
the section 4(l) exemption. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1) (1994);
and Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(g)(1)(ii), 230.902(g)(2),
230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3) (1998).
3S Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2) (1998).
352 In the release accompanying the amendments, the Commission stated that issuers
"would be free to require purchasers not to engage in any hedging transactions, even if the
transaction would be consistent with the Securities Act." Amending Release, supra note 4,
at 9635 n.28. It is questionable, therefore, whether purchasers required to agree not to en-
gage in hedging transactions are liable in any way for violating such agreements even
though their hedging activities would be deemed to be in compliance with the Securities Act
absent these purchasing agreements.
353 See GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1960.
5 See id. This intent factor might be very hard to prove absent such a purchaser imme-
diately short selling the same amount and type of securities as it had purchased through
Regulation S.
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C. Probable Impact of Amendments on Marketplace Concerns
The new amendments will definitely have an impact on concerns in
the marketplace about the regulation.35 In particular, the amendments will
affect the discount, disclosure, and dilution aspects of the regulation that
have generated in the marketplace allegations of an unfair and exclusive
advantage to foreign investors.356 A look at how the amendments should
impact on these three attributes should assist in predicting whether there
will be continued scrutiny of the regulation by the marketplace.
1. Greater Discounts Will Be Offered By Domestic Issuers
Securities offered under Regulation S will probably be offered at
greater discounts to the prevailing market price by domestic issuers due to
equity securities of domestic reporting issuers now being subject to a
holding period of one year, as opposed to 40 days.357 The risks that pur-
chasers will now have to undergo as a result of waiting a full year will
cause less demand for these securities and greater discounts offered to en-
tice buyers for them.35 These discounts will be even more necessary given
the expansion of the transactional restrictions and the restricted securities
classification to securities of domestic issuers which will make these secu-
rities less liquid and more restricted within the marketplace.359
Nonreporting domestic issuers will probably now have to offer very
large discounts to the prevailing market price to remain somewhat com-
petitive with reporting issuers. Domestic reporting issuers are now subject
to the same type of restrictions as domestic nonreporting issuers; however,
the securities of reporting issuers are much more tradable in the market-
place. Therefore, domestic nonreporting issuers will probably need to offer
very attractive discounts to attract purchasers who might otherwise choose
to buy Regulation S securities offered by reporting issuers.
2. Dilution May Become a Problem Depending on the Discounts Offered
The potential of greater discounts being offered due to heavier restric-
tions on domestic equity securities may or may not play a role in the dilu-
tive problems associated with the regulation. If discounts offered are so
great that purchasers will patiently wait out a year to capitalize on enor-
mous potential profits, then at the end of the distribution compliance pe-
... See supra IV.B.1-3 and notes 163-78 and accompanying text.
356 See id.
311 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(A) (1998).
... The Commission has acknowledged that it expects discounts on Regulation S securi-
ties to grow as a result of the increase in the distribution compliance period from 40 days to
one year. See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9639. The Commission noted, however,
that it could not determine how large this increase was likely to be. See id.
319 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(b)(3)(iii)-(iv), 230.905 (1998). See
also Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3)(v) (1997).
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riod, there will be an immediate and more imminent flowback of securities
to the United States.35 0 This flowback will in turn dilute the stock and
cause share prices to fall. Therefore, large discounts, if extremely attrac-
tive, could make the dilution problem even more poisonous than before.
However, if discounts offered are not very attractive, then offshore pur-
chasers will probably not purchase these securities at all. Then, of course,
there would be no dilution problem because there would be no securities to
flow back into the United States. Thus, there will be a balancing act in the
marketplace between discounts being offered and the foreign purchaser's
willingness to wait out the one year restricted period.36' Following the
amendments, at least a year is needed to determine whether flowback will
continue to be a problem in the regulation.
3. Disclosure May Become a Problem
The most important marketplace concern addressed by the amend-
ments is the issue of disclosure. In the amendments, the Commission
modified but maintained a Regulation S reporting requirement when it
eliminated the fifteen day Form 8-K reporting in favor of quarterly report-
ing.362 Quarterly reporting should provide adequate disclosure to current
shareholders about an issuer's Regulation S offering before any of the di-
lutive harms associated with the offering can be felt on the market price of
the existing shares. This will also give shareholders the chance to com-
plain to the issuer when these offerings involve discounts that might be
perceived as too high. The days when issuers could sell their securities
31 The Commission has noted that "securities sold offshore at a discount from the U.S.
market price are likely to be resold in the United States at the earliest possible date for the
purchaser to realize a profit." Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9265.
36 The dilutive harms associated with Regulation S offerings can still be profitable for
short-sellers even though the distribution compliance period has been lengthened from 40
days to a full year. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. Short-sellers can browse
through quarterly filings to find numerous securities offerings under Regulation S. The
short seller can then pick a particular offering in which securities were offered at large dis-
counts to the prevailing market price and calendar a date a little less than a year after this
initial offering. This later date would represent a time right before the one year holding pe-
riod would end and the securities could be sold back into the United States. If, at this later
date, the prevailing market price is still a lot higher than the price in which the securities
were originally offered, then the short seller could sell short right before the one year hold-
ing period ends, then cover his short positions after the one year holding period has ended
and foreigner purchasers have wreaked havoc on the share price by dumping their shares in
the United States and diluting the stock. This may have been easier to do prior to the
amendments when there was a 40 day holding period, but it can still be done today with a
one year holding period.
362 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9637. See also supra Part VI.C.1 and notes
296-98 and accompanying text.
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offshore under Regulation S at any price they wanted without informing
their existing shareholders should be a thing of the past.363
While the disclosure requirements should be enough to give current
shareholders the chance to protect themselves from the dilutive harms as-
sociated with the flowback of securities, this disclosure may not be timely
enough if the market hears of a Regulation S offering before the sharehold-
ers do. News of a Regulation S offering can lead to the short selling of an
issuer's stock and consequently can cause the issuer's stock price to fall.
Quarterly reporting will not give existing shareholders the chance to sell
their shares before such a fall because professionals in the market will most
likely find out about a Regulation S offering before current shareholders
do.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD ABUSES OF THE REGULATION
CONTINUE AFTER THE AMENDMENTS
Whether the amendments will deter ongoing abuses in the regulation
remains to be seen. Some abusers of the regulation may never be deterred
absent enforcement action by the SEC. Other abusers may not even know
or realize that they are violating the regulation. For this reason, if abuses
do not stop with the amendments, the Commission should better identify
the abuses of the regulation and follow a clarified regulation with aggres-
sive enforcement action. If this two step approach is followed, then the
regulation should be cleaned of violators of the regulation who have tainted
the regulation's validity in the marketplace since its promulgation.
A. Clarify Regulatory Abuses or Law Regarding Abuses of the Regulation
1. The Need for Clarity
In the past, the Commission's interpretation of Preliminary Note 2 has
served as notice from the SEC of what it considers to be a violation of
Regulation S.3 The Commission laid out a framework of what it per-
ceived to be violations in its Problematic Practices Release. 365 However,
"' See Morgenson, supra note 102, at 37. However, the quarterly disclosure requirement
may still not provide enough information to unsophisticated investors who do not customar-
ily comb through quarterly reports.
" See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. Preliminary Note 2 (1998); Problematic Prac-
tices Release, supra note 96, at 35,664. See also note 131 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Candie's, Securities Act Release No. 7263, 61 SEC Docket 758 (Feb. 21, 1996).
Preliminary Note 2 is not altogether clear when it states that Regulation S is not available for
any transaction or series of transactions that are schemes to evade the registration require-
ments of the Act. See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. Preliminary Note 2 (1998).
161 See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,663-64. See also supra Part
V.B and notes 184-90 and accompanying text. However, the Problematic Practices Release
was an interpretative release not contained within the regulation itself. See Problematic
Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,663. It is recommended that these abuses should be
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the SEC found violations of the regulation in Candie's and GFL Ultra
Fund for transactions that occurred before the Problematic Practices Re-
lease formally labeled certain uses of promissory notes and hedging as pro-
hibited.3" This apparent retroactive application of what the Commission
deemed to be violations of Regulation S can strike fear into those seeking
to comply with the regulation.
The uncertainty in the regulation, the lack of clarity in Preliminary
Note 2, and the Commission's ability to render decisions on an almost ret-
roactive basis appears to have made many practitioners overly cautious
when structuring Regulation S transactions. This is probably why a Com-
mission survey done prior to the amendments found that practicing attor-
neys dealing in Category Two domestic equity securities were also
complying with the Category Three certification and legending require-
ments "as a matter of common practice." '367 These attorneys probably were
not satisfying such unnecessary and additional requirements without rea-
son. They were most likely meeting these requirements to protect them-
selves from the dreadful day when the SEC came knocking on their door.
If the amendments do not limit or end abuses in the regulation, then it
is recommended that the regulation be clarified to outline what the Com-
mission considers to be violations. A clarified, more understandable, and
stronger regulation that more specifically addresses abuses of the regula-
tion itself should serve to create more certainty and confidence in the com-
pliance and use of the regulation.36
2. Ways to Clarify the Regulation
There are two ways that the Commission could clarify the prohibitions
associated with Regulation S. The Commission could state what it deems
identified more clearly, either by stating that they are prohibited or by clarifying the law re-
garding these abuses within the regulation itself.
3" See Candie's, 61 SEC Docket at 761; GFL Ultra Fund, 64 See Docket at 1961-63.
This is one of the reasons why former Commissioner Wallman dissented in the GFL Ultra
Fund case. See id. at 1962-63. He noted that "the Commission failed to make any formal
pronouncements regarding Regulation S until the issuance of the Problematic Practices Re-
lease." Id. at 1962. He further noted that it was in the Problematic Practices Release that
"the Commission raised concerns about hedging in the U.S. markets by purchasers of
Regulation S securities during the restricted period." Id. Therefore, he felt that bringing an
"after the fact" enforcement case for transactions that took place before the issuance of the
Problematic Practices Release was not warranted. See id. See also supra pp. 83-84 and
notes 153-55.
" Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9639.
16' The issue of the Commission's sometimes vague construction of the securities laws
has received a lot of attention lately as it appears that some courts are criticizing the Com-
mission for its lack of specific standards when defining certain types of misconduct under
the securities laws. See Paul Beckett, Lack of SEC Rules Irks Appeals Courts, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 14, 1998, at B7. See also Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998); SEC v.
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
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to be abuses directly in the regulation itself, possibly within the preliminary
notes section. However, an outline of abuses should not be too exclusive
because such overregulation can have the danger of enabling other loop-
holes to arise. A second approach would be to rewrite the regulation to
clarify the laws as they pertain to abuses. In this regard, the provisions
concerning the abuses could be delineated more clearly rather than over-
lapping Rule 144 with Regulation S. The laws as they apply to abuses
could also be outlined better so that those seeking to comply will know ex-
actly what is prohibited by a simple reading of the regulation.
(a) Promissory Notes
(i) Incorporate Rule 144 Promissory Note Provisions Directly Into
Regulation S
The Commission's approach in dealing with abuses concerning prom-
issory notes now requires a reading of the Rule 144 provisions with the
rules governing Regulation S.369 This overlap of Rule 144 with Regulation
S, while a good effort by the SEC, does not directly address promissory
notes within the regulation. If the promissory note problem continues, then
the tolling and resale provisions governing promissory notes under Rule
144 should be specifically written within Regulation S. These provisions
can be written in the regulation separately from any restricted securities
analysis or other reading under Rule 144. The regulation could, in effect,
have the Rule 144-type provisions apply to the issuer safe harbors and tie
in the distribution compliance period as the holding period applicable to
those provisions. This would provide a better understanding of what the
rules are relating to the use of promissory notes and not require a reading
of a separate regulation.
(ii) Recommendations Concerning Promissory Notes If A More Clari-
fied Regulation does not Work
(a) Toll the One Year Holding Period Until Promissory Notes Are
Fully Paid
If the Commission's formula for solving the promissory note problem
does not work, the SEC could toll the one year distribution compliance pe-
riod or holding period until the promissory note is fully paid. Under the
amendments incorporating the Rule 144 promissory note provisions to do-
mestic issuers covered under Regulation S, the holding period will not be-
gin to run until the promissory note provides for full recourse against the
purchaser of the securities and is secured by collateral having a fair market
" See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998); Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. §
144(d)(2) (1997).
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value at least equal to the purchase price of the securities purchased.37
After the holding period requirement has been satisfied, the promissory
note must then be fully paid before there can be a resale of the securities
bought under Regulation S.37" ' Once the promissory note is paid, the secu-
rities can be resold immediately. A purchaser could always borrow money
to pay off the promissory note, sell his Regulation S securities right away
and then use the proceeds to repay the lender. In reality, the purchaser
would be repaying the promissory note with proceeds from the resale of
Regulation S securities. Therefore, the promissory note problem, where
the expectation of repayment stems from the resale of Regulation S securi-
ties back into the U.S. market, can still occur via a lender being used as a
middleman. The best way to avoid this potential problem is to toll the one
year distribution compliance period or holding period until the promissory
note has been fully paid.
(b) Prohibit the Use ofPromissory Notes Altogether as Payment for
Regulation S Securities
The most drastic recommendation if the promissory note problem
continues after the amendments is to prohibit the use of promissory notes
altogether as payment for domestic equity securities offered under the
regulation. This type of prohibition was originally proposed by the Com-
mission in its proposed amendments to Regulation S. 372 If this measure is
considered too extreme, an alternative would be to limit such a prohibition
to only non-recourse promissory notes.
(b) Place more Clarifying Language in the Regulation Stating that the Re-
sale Safe Harbor Cannot be Used to "Wash Off" Restrictions
The use of the resale safe harbor as a means for washing off restric-
tions from otherwise restricted securities has been delineated as prohibitive
to an extent under Rule 905." 3 However, as with the case of promissory
notes, the Commission again overlapped Rule 144 with Regulation S by
stating that the resale safe harbor could not be used to wash off restrictions
from otherwise restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144."
The Commission's formula of intermixing Rule 144 with Regulation S
might very well provide adequate notice that the resale safe harbor cannot
370 See Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(2)(i)(ii) (1997).
371 See id. § 230.144(d)(2)(iii); Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9637.
371 See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9262-63. The proposed
amendments to the regulation would have put a provision within Category Three stating that
"no promissory note" could "be received as payment" for securities offered under Regula-
tion S. See id. at 9274. This provision would have been contained in a proposed section
230.903(b)(3)(iv)(B)(5). See id.
373 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (1998).
374 See id.
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be used as an avenue for washing off restrictions. However, if problems
continue in this area after the amendments, the Commission should con-
sider putting in a blanket statement within the regulation itself prohibiting
the use of the resale safe harbor as a means for washing off restrictions.
Such a statement could be put either in the resale safe harbor or in the pre-
liminary notes section of the regulation. The Commission could also try
using some of the language it had previously used in its Problematic Prac-
tices Release and the In Touch Global, LLC no-action letter.37 Some of
this language included a statement to the effect that "Rule 904 cannot be
used for the purpose of washing off resale restrictions, such as the holding
period requirement for restricted securities in Rule 144. "376 Another state-
ment provided, "If a person with restricted securities sold the securities in
an offshore transaction and replaced them with a repurchase of fungible un-
restricted securities, the replacement securities would be subject to the
same restrictions as those replaced." '377 Either or both of these two state-
ments within the regulation should help make clear that the resale safe har-
bor cannot be used to wash off restrictions without there being any kind of
separate reading required under Rule 144.
(c) Hedging Activities Prohibited Under the Regulation Need To Be De-
lineated in the Regulation
The prohibitions against hedging should be specifically spelled out in
some form within the Regulation. The Commission is talking about adding
provisions dealing with hedging under Rule 144 which would be applicable
to restricted securities under Regulation S.37' This approach, while using
Rule 144 as an avenue to address hedging, would be better than the status
quo being that the Commission has not addressed the issue of hedging in
any way within the regulation itself.
The GFL Ultra Fund case found hedging in Regulation S to be pro-
hibited, and the amendments added new anti-hedging provisions applicable
to securities offered by domestic issuers.379 Yet the amending release
stated that the amendments did not impose any new restrictions on hedging
under the regulation.3 1 In light of these conflicting standards and unan-
swered questions about hedging, the Commission needs to delineate what
3" See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35664; In Touch Global, LLC,
supra note 137, at 77,039.
376 In Touch Global, LLC, supra note 137, at 77,039.
377 Id.
37' Revision of Rule 144, Rule 145 and Form 144, supra note 199, at 9252-53. See also
supra p. 116 and notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
171 See GFL Ultra Fund, 64 SEC Docket at 1961; Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§
230.902(g)(1)(ii), 230.902(g)(2), 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3).
380 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9635 n.28.
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forms of hedging are prohibited in the regulation."' The lack of unani-
mous Commission support in the GFL Ultra Fund case and the spotty and
somewhat conflicting references to hedging in the amendments cannot
serve as valid notice to the investing public as to what hedging activities
are prohibited in the regulation.
(d) Abuses Concerning Illegal Resales and Phony Offshore Shell Entities
Do Not Need To Be Better Clarified In the Regulation
Abuses concerning resales within the distribution compliance period
and the use of phony offshore shell entities probably do not necessitate
much more clarity than what is already provided by the regulation. The
regulation plainly states that a sale of Regulation S securities cannot be
made in the United States within a respective distribution compliance pe-
riod.382 The regulation also provides that a corporation formed overseas by
a U.S. person for the purposes of investing in unregistered securities will
still be deemed a U.S. person and, therefore, unable to purchase securities
under the regulation.3"3 These provisions are fairly straightforward and
there is probably no need to repeat or clarify them in the regulation. There-
fore, the second step recommendation of aggressive enforcement action is
only recommended as against these types of abuses.
B. Aggressive Enforcement Action
Once violations of Regulation S are laid out in some clear format for
the securities industry to understand, the Commission's enforcement staff
should weed out abusers of the regulation. These enforcement actions
should not serve to alarm practitioners seeking to validly use the regula-
tion, because such practitioners would know that these enforcement actions
were warranted in light of a clarified regulation. A clarified Regulation S
will serve as a sword for the SEC and a shield for those seeking to validly
comply, leaving abusers out in the open to be slaughtered.
Enforcement actions by themselves cannot resolve all of the problems
occurring in the regulation due to the limited resources available to the
SEC. However, a clarified regulation, together with a strong and visible
enforcement program directed at abusers, should provide a strong deter-
rence against abuses of the regulation in the future. Then, with time,
Regulation S may become a valid and respectable means of raising capital
in the financial marketplace.
3I One of the most important issues left up in the air is whether individual investors can
be held accountable for hedging activities in association with discounted purchases of secu-
rities offered under Regulation S. See supra p. 84 and notes 156-57.
32 See Amended Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(f), 230.903(b)(2)(ii),
230.903(b)(3)(ii)(A), 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(A) (1998).
383 See id. § 230.902(k)(1)(viii).
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C. Foreign Issuers Should Be Left Alone
The two step recommendation of clarifying abuses in the regulation
followed up with aggressive enforcement action is not recommended
against foreign issuers. There has been no evidence of Regulation S abuses
involving the securities of foreign issuers; however, the Commission has
considered imposing additional restrictions on these issuers in the past.3
Absent the evolution of widespread abuses, foreign issuers should be left
alone, and no additional restrictions should be placed on these securities.
Securities of foreign issuers have not been a source of abuse and should not
be hindered by additional restrictions aimed at halting abuses in the regu-
lation.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS IF MARKETPLACE CONCERNS CONTINUE AFTER
THE AMENDMENTS
The amendments were specifically enacted to address the regulatory
abuses occurring under Regulation S.35 In doing so, the amendments also
addressed some of the marketplace concerns surrounding the regulation.
While the Commission should not seek to directly interfere with the eco-
nomics of the marketplace, it should arguably correct any unfair advan-
tages it may have unintentionally placed in the markets when those
advantages have led to regulatory abuses. The Commission should look
closely at and address some of the marketplace concerns when seeking to
clean up the regulation if problems continue after the amendments. Two
very important marketplace concerns that the Commission should focus on
deals with the issues of disclosure and discounts.
... The Commission had previously proposed subjecting foreign reporting issuers with a
principal market in the United States for its securities to the Category Three requirements
and restricted securities classification under Rule 144. See Proposed Amendments Release,
supra note 152, at 9260, 9263. See also supra pp. 91-92 and notes 196-99 and accompa-
nying text. In the proposed amendments the Commission conceded that it was not aware of
widespread abuses involving the securities of foreign issuers but still felt that a "potential for
abuse" existed in these type of securities. Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152,
at 9263. The Commission noted that "although abusive practices under Regulation S have
not been as evident in offerings by foreign issuers" it was "concerned that the economic in-
centives for indirect distributions and resales into the United States are the same for equity
offerings of both domestic companies, and foreign companies where the principal market for
the securities is in the United States." Id. at 9263-64. Commentors strongly opposed to
these restrictions argued that such restrictions were unwarranted as there were no abuses in
this area of the regulation. See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9633. With the com-
mentors objections in mind, the Commission decided not to extend the additional restric-
tions on foreign issuers. See id. However, the Commission warned that it would "monitor
practices in this area" and "revisit the issue if abuses occur." Id. See also Amended Regu-
lation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(1)(2) (1998). The Commission stated in the amendments
that "absent a showing of abuse, imposing significant new restrictions on the offshore of-
fering practices of foreign companies is not warranted." Amending Release, supra note 4, at
9633.385 See Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9632.
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The most important marketplace concern is the issue of disclosure.
Disclosure is the key to letting investors protect themselves. Present
shareholders of an issuer doing a Regulation S offering cannot be hurt by
the dilutive effects of the offering if they know about and have the chance
to sell their shares before the flow of securities back into the United States.
In this regard, the discount and marketplace dilution concerns are irrelevant
as long as there is disclosure available to existing domestic shareholders.
The disclosure of Regulation S offerings should always be mandated. 85
The timing of disclosure is also an important factor for the protection
of domestic shareholders. At the very least, disclosure should always be
required before the end of a distribution compliance period when foreign
purchasers can sell their securities back into the United States. Disclosure
in advance of an offering would also be very helpful in allowing existing
shareholders the chance to sell their securities before the market gets wind
of a Regulation S offering. News of an offering can often have the detri-
mental effect of driving down the existing shareholder's stock price and
advance notice of such an offering would give existing shareholders the
chance to avoid these harmful market effects.387
As a result of the extension of the distribution compliance period to a
full year for domestic issuers, there will probably be fewer complaints in
the marketplace about the regulation's unfairness in providing an economic
advantage to foreign purchasers. However, if this extension in the holding
period results in outlandish discounts being offered, there could be a flood-
gate of new marketplace concerns about the regulation. Some discounts
can be warranted to an extent, but if these discounts become too extreme,
then the Commission should think about controlling the discounts that can
be offered. The Commission could choose a straight prohibition, limit the
discounts, or simply eliminate the availability of the Regulation S safe har-
bor for discounts beyond a certain specified percentage amount (e.g., dis-
counts greater than 30%).38
311 If the Commission ever decides to lessen the distribution compliance period for
Regulation S securities with regard to domestic issuers, it should at least adjust the reporting
requirements under Regulation S accordingly to provide for timely disclosure for existing
shareholders. Therefore, if for some reason the distribution compliance period is lessened
from one year to ninety days or less, then the Commission should scrap the quarterly re-
porting requirement and go back to a reporting requirement of fifteen days or less. See su-
pra Part V.C and notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
3S7 Advance disclosure of 48 hours or more should provide sufficient notice. The possi-
bility of a negative effect on an issuer's stock price from news of a Regulation S offering
takes into consideration that short-sellers often short stocks involved in Regulation S offer-
ings and that many perceive such offerings to be signs of a company's weakening financial
state. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
388 Placing a limit on discounts that can be offered has been considered in the past by the
Commission. See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,665; Proposed
Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9265. In the Problematic Practices Release, the
Commission requested comment on the possibility of excluding certain discounted offers
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Overall, if the amendments do not resolve the regulatory problems in-
volving Regulation S, then the regulation should be clarified in a better
fashion and the SEC should aggressively pursue abusers who continue to
violate the regulation. To curb any complaints about the regulation in the
marketplace, disclosure of Regulation S offerings should always be man-
dated and discounts controlled if they become too extreme. If the amend-
ments or the recommendations noted above serve to clear up problems with
the regulation and conform it as an effective and valid means of raising
capital, then the Commission should consider relaxing some of the restric-
tions imposed on domestic reporting issuers.
X. RECOMMENDATIONS IF AMENDED REGULATION BECOMES TOO
RESTRICTIVE FOR DOMESTIC ISSUERS IN THE ABSENCE OF ABUSES
Domestic reporting issuers took the hardest hit by the amendments and
may have become a casualty as a result of abuses in the regulation. Regu-
lation S may no longer be used by domestic issuers as a means for raising
capital offshore because securities offered by these issuers will be less
marketable in light of the new offering and transactional restrictions.
These issuers will incur higher costs when seeking to comply with the re-
quirements under the regulation. In the end the costs associated with doing
a Regulation S offering may not outweigh the costs of simply registering
the securities.3"9
If the Commission did not intend to eliminate the availability of
Regulation S as an exemption for domestic reporting issuers, then it should
consider relaxing some of the restrictions pertaining to these issuers. When
the Commission originally adopted Regulation S, it differentiated the re-
quirements between domestic reporting and nonreporting issuers, given the
amount of information about these issuers in the marketplace.3" As there
is more information available in the marketplace about reporting issuers
from the issuer safe harbor. See Problematic Practices Release, supra note 96, at 35,665.
However, in its proposed amendments to the regulation, the Commission decided not to
propose requirements specifically limiting the amount of discounts that could be offered, but
again requested comment on whether certain discounted offers should be excluded from the
safe harbors. See Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 152, at 9265.
39 Even the Commission noted in the release accompanying the amendments that "do-
mestic reporting companies that find it too cumbersome to take advantage of the Regulation
S safe harbor" when conducting an offering could "simply register under the Securities Act
or resort to other exempt offerings." Amending Release, supra note 4, at 9636. However,
the timeliness of raising capital under Regulation S is still an important benefit of utilizing a
Regulation S offering versus going through the registration process.
390 See Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 80,675. See also supra p. 67 and notes 47-48
and accompanying text.
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than nonreporting issuers, these two issuers should probably not be subject
to the same restrictions.39'
If abuses stop in the regulation, the Commission should consider re-
viving the regulation's resourcefulness as applied to domestic reporting is-
suers. It should consider a reduction in the distribution compliance period
from one year to six months along with an elimination of the restricted se-
curities classification for such securities. It should also consider a reduc-
tion of the transactional restrictions back to the Category Two
requirements. If, in relaxing these standards, the Commission becomes
concerned about large discounts leading to a recurrence of abuses, then the
Commission should consider imposing the Category Three requirements,
including the one year distribution compliance period, on all discounted of-
ferings by domestic reporting issuers that exceed a specified minimal per-
centage.392 All of these recommendations should breathe new life into the
regulation's usefulness to domestic issuers if the Commission desires to re-
vive the regulation's application in the domestic marketplace.
XI. CONCLUSION
The Commission meant well when it adopted Regulation S back in
1990. The regulation made the offshore markets more accessible to do-
mestic corporations and diminished the cost of raising capital overseas.
The securities laws were adjusted to meet the demands of the international
marketplace. Unfortunately, loopholes were exploited in the regulation and
widespread abuses led to increased scrutiny. The Commission was eventu-
ally forced to limit the great financial tool in Regulation S that it had cre-
ated only earlier in the decade.
The fall of the Iron Curtain and the expansion of economies interna-
tionally have led to resources in capital from just about every comer of the
world. Regulation S has the potential to be truly responsive to these op-
portunities. Just because some pirates have exploited the regulation's safe
harbors does not mean that the regulation should be destroyed or forgotten.
The safe harbors just need to be better protected. With hope, in time the
regulation will have the chance to flourish and become one of the more
useful regulations in today's global economy.
391 Domestic reporting issuers are subject to more requirements than domestic nonre-
porting issuers because domestic reporting issuers are required to report their Regulation S
offerings. See supra Part VI.C.1 and notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
392 This was previously considered and requested for comment by the Commission in its
Problematic Practices Release. See Problematic Practices release, supra note 96, at 35,665.
